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Abstract
Following the murder of George Floyd in May of 2020 by police officer Derek Chauvin, a
protest began in the city of Minneapolis that resulted in the burning down of the third precinct
police building, the looting of a local Target, and the destruction of over one hundred buildings
in the area. But despite this violence, the Minneapolis uprising sparked a wave of protests that
spread to over sixty countries on every continent of the globe. Why was Floyd’s murder so
politically mobilizing? And why did this protest inspire so many others? To answer these
questions, I treat the video recording of Floyd’s murder as a rhetorical text which has the
capacity to transform viewers into affective witnesses. Then, by carefully analyzing statements
made by participants of the Minneapolis uprising, I show how protest participants used the
affective experience of witnessing Floyd’s murder to weave a complex justification for the
violence of the protest. I argue that this view of the protest helps explain its success in spreading,
as well as its ultimate undermining in the American social consciousness. This project has
implications for how, through rhetoric, individuals and social movements are able to reach
beyond the limits of a conceptual framework of meaning and gesture towards new horizons of
intelligibility. This project also supports and complicates several theoretical conceptions of
witnessing.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the winter of 2012 in Sanford, Florida, 17-year-old Trayvon Martin was walking back
to his father’s fiancé's house after running to a local convenience store. While passing through
the Twin Lakes housing community, he was confronted by George Zimmerman, a neighborhood
watch volunteer. Zimmerman had called the police on Martin and had reported that Martin
“look[ed] like he was up to no good” (Taylor & Davis, 2016, p. 138) and was probably on drugs.
The dispatcher told Zimmerman to wait for the police to arrive, but Zimmerman said that would
take too long. Zimmerman confronted Martin, a fight broke out, and Martin was shot and killed.
But of course, these are not the details that made this case exceptional. It was law
enforcement’s handling of the situation going forward that marked it. Zimmerman told the police
that Martin had been the aggressor and that Zimmerman had only been defending himself from
Martin’s attack. Despite the significant age and size difference between the two (Zimmerman
being significantly heavier than Martin) the police took this story as truth, identified Martin as
“John Doe” and called it a day. They made no attempt to find out who Martin was or why he had
been in the housing community. But as details about the killing became public it became harder
and harder to not see the entire handling of the case as a double standard. Had Zimmerman been
Black, and Trayvon white, it seems obvious that Zimmerman would have been arrested and held
until a full investigation could be done. It took 6 weeks of national protests for Zimmerman to
even be arrested and charged for the killing of Trayvon.
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In 2013, George Zimmerman was acquitted for the role he played in Trayvon’s killing.
After the acquittal, political activist Alicia Garza wrote “I continue to be surprised at how little
Black lives matter. And I will continue that. stop giving up on black life. Black people. I love
you. I love us. Our lives matter.” (Biesecker, 2017). In response to this post another activist,
Patrisse Khan-Cullors, created hashtag, “#BlackLivesMatter” (Khan-Cullors & Bandele, 2018).
Through the concerted effort of Garza, Cullors, and activist Opal Tometi, all Black
women and two of whom are queer, #BlackLivesMatter became a way of focusing the multitude
of stories and experiences of Black people in the United States into an inter-connected narrative
of state oppression and racism. By using the hashtag Black people (as well as others) from all
across the country were able to share their stories and respond to each other's experiences. By the
time Michael Brown was killed in 2014, “Black Lives Matter!” became the rallying cry for
protestors in Ferguson and elsewhere. More than just a hashtag, BlackLivesMatter served as a
label for a mindset, “a movement” that sought to actively resist state oppression. And the
movement was growing, as Jelani Cobb of The New York Times reports, “Within a few weeks of
Brown’s death, hundreds of people who had never participated in organized protest took to the
street” (Cobb, 2016; Biesecker, 2017).
Despite this growth, BLM was generally viewed unfavorably. In fact, the movement was
generally regarded unfavorably by most voters until 2020 (Cohn & Quealy, 2020). Despite the
long list of Black people killed by police, and despite continued protesting and attempts to bring
attention to this injustice, most Americans saw BLM as more of a distraction than a force for
good. But then something happened that changed the reception of BLM for people all over the
world. On May 25, 2020, Officer Derek Chauvin arrested 46-year-old George Floyd, and in the
execution of that arrest Chauvin handcuffed Floyd, laid him on his stomach, then proceeded to
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kneel on the back of his neck. He stayed that way for 9 minutes and 29 seconds (the initial
reported time was 8 minutes and 46 seconds, but during Chauvin’s trial the prosecution
established that it was 9 minutes and 29 seconds). During that time Floyd repeatedly pleaded
with Chauvin to get up as he could not breathe, but his pleas were ignored. Bystanders also
pleaded with Chauvin and the other officers present to get off of Floyd’s neck, but they were
similarly ignored. By the time Chauvin got up, Floyd was dead. The whole thing had been
recorded by 17-year-old Darnella Frazier, who posted the video for all to see. The killing was
egregious, flagrant, and wholly absurd. It cannot be made to make sense.
Yet despite its lack of sense, this video affected mainstream consciousness differently. As
stated before, there was a sharp increase in the amount of people who viewed BLM favorably in
the two-weeks following the killing of Floyd. Furthermore, the protests that erupted in response
to Floyd’s killing and the lack of local, state, and federal response were the most drastic of any
BLM protests to date. Yet favorability increased and not just in the United States. The protests
that started in response to Floyd’s killing grew into the largest civil rights protest the world has
ever seen (Buchanan, Bui, & Patel, 2020). Reciprocal protests began in cities like Memphis, Los
Angeles, and Seattle before spreading to every state in the nation, resulting in over 4,400 arrests
and the activation of over 62,000 National Guard Troops (Sternlicht, 2020). Internationally,
protests in support of Floyd were held in over 60 countries on every continent. These protests,
not unlike protestors here in the United States, often used Floyd as a rallying point around which
they also protested their own domestic abuses of police and state authority (Protests across the
Globe after George Floyd’s Death, 2020). In this sense, Floyd became symbolic of a larger
struggle against state oppression.
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But Floyd’s killing was not new or unique in its details, its brutality, or its senselessness.
Not only this, but conservative responses to the killing of Floyd were not kind. Floyd was
painted as “not an angel,” a drug addict, and a sexual deviant. This kind of painting of Black
victims is not new (Lieberman, 2011; Ployd, 2020) and coupled with the claim that BLM was a
Marxist organization, it is surprising that the protests became as impactful as they did. But this
impact was born out of a contested field of interpretation regarding images of Floyd and the
protest. This kind of contestation can reveal both how groups see themselves and how others
attempt to portray them (Wilkins, Livingstone, & Levine, 2019) making them sites of rhetorical
construction and conflict. What is it about the image of George Floyd that so differently affected
mainstream consciousness? Why did BLM’s approval skyrocket in response to this particular
video and image? Why weren’t conservative constructions of Floyd successful in diverting
activist energy away from the protests?
While Floyd himself served as a contested field for victim construction, the greater calls
for police, justice, and social reform became tied to Floyd’s body and simultaneously swirled
around and stuck to all events done in Floyd’s name. In this way, activists and mourners
marshalled an economy of affect which they then invested into their statements and actions. I
mention this because the day after Floyd’s death, a protest march began to oscillate between
peaceful and destructive. Known as “the Minneapolis uprising,” for 3 nights the city of
Minneapolis was in the hands of protestors, as the city government had no plan or course of
action for how to quell the uprising or how to keep others safe. By the time the National Guard
enforced a curfew, over 100 buildings had been completely destroyed, including a Target and the
police precinct building that Chauvin and the other 3 officers worked out of. Images of the
uprising, including the destruction of the precinct and looting of the Target, were circulated en
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masse. This was coupled with comments from then President Donald Trump that positioned the
uprising as the work of criminals which demanded a forceful response, including lethal action.
Yet this uprising inspired protests that sprung up all over the United States and the world. How,
if at all, did the affective connection to Floyd help the Minneapolis uprising become viewed as a
political event rather than an act of random violence?
I approach these questions as an investigation of the video recording of Floyd’s killing as
visual text, one that speaks not only to those who view it but against those who attempted to
construct Floyd as a violent drug-addict who was the victim of his own poor decisions. This
requires looking not only at the affective and emotional experience of watching the video, but
also at the varied ways in which others have described their experiences of watching the video.
In a similar vein, I will also look at how the images of the Minneapolis uprising were presented
and contested within public opinion and how Floyd’s murder was mobilized as an affective
anchor within the chaos of a dynamic and fluid protest event.
05.25.2020
In South Minneapolis, there is a neighborhood market store called “CUP foods.”
Originally standing for “Chicago Unbeatable Prices” the store has served as a community hub for
more than 30 years. Situated on the corner of Chicago Avenue and 38th Street in South
Minneapolis, many people go to the store to get groceries, snacks, or purchase more minutes for
their phones. Many of the patrons know the owners and employees that work there on a first
name basis. George Floyd was one such patron, often going to the store to make purchases and to
catch up with friends and family who happened to be stopping by. It was a similar visit that
brought Floyd to the CUP foods on the day of May 25, 2020.
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Christopher Martin, 19, who was working there that day reported that just prior to Floyd
entering the store, a different person had attempted to make a purchase with a false 20-dollar bill.
The older employee caught this and said he wouldn’t be able to finish the transaction. That person
then left, and the older employee then left the clerk alone to finish working the register. This is
when Floyd entered the store and purchased a pack of cigarettes. Martin recognized the bill was a
forgery, but he said he accepted it anyway because he did not think Floyd knew the bill was
counterfeit and wanted to “do him a favor” (Bogel-Burroughs & Wright, 2021). The older clerk,
however, told Martin to go outside and bring Floyd back in, as they could not accept the $20 he
had given them. Martin went out to get Floyd, but Floyd refused to come back inside, getting in
his car outside of the store instead. This prompted the older employee to have a third employee
call 911.
Officers J. Alexander Kueng, Thomas Lane, Tou Thao, and Derek Chauvin responded to
the call. According to the transcripts of the body camera footage (The New York Times, 2020),
officers Kueng, Lane, and Chauvin circled around the car and demanded that Floyd get out.
Floyd was apparently too hesitant in responding to these demands and so officer Lane pulled his
gun out and pointed it at eye level towards Floyd, demanding that he show his hands and get out
of the vehicle. Floyd immediately begins apologizing, explaining that he has been shot before
and that it was in a similar situation to the one he’s in now. He begins to beg the officer not to
shoot him, and Lane assures him that he won’t shoot, he just wants Floyd to cooperate. Floyd
gets out of the car and is placed in handcuffs while the other officers attempt to speak with the
other occupants of the car. While this is happening, Floyd continues to protest his innocence,
while Lane and Kueng continually ask Floyd if he is on something or if he is intoxicated. Floyd
tells them several times that there is nothing wrong with him, he is just scared.
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The officers then attempt to take Floyd to their cruiser to put him in the back for holding.
Floyd says that he does not want to get in the vehicle, telling the officers that he is
claustrophobic, and he attempts to offer alternatives to being placed in the car's backseat (from
not being placed in the car, to being place in the front seat, to sitting on the ground, to laying on
the ground) but the officers say they are not interested in listening to Floyd. Floyd eventually
complies and gets in the vehicle, but he becomes distressed and starts to get out. This is when
officer Chauvin becomes involved, attempting to subdue Floyd during his attempts to leave the
vehicle. Floyd, despite being handcuffed, is able to get out of the car, at which point he attempts
to sit on the ground, but Chauvin drives him further down until Floyd is lying face down on the
street with Chauvin’s knees driving into Floyd’s neck and back.
Floyd begins to plead with Chauvin to please get off of his neck, but Chauvin does not
respond. Floyd becomes more distressed and tries even harder to get Chauvin’s attention, telling
him “I can’t breathe,” but Chauvin responds by saying that it takes a lot of air to talk, implying
that Floyd is getting enough air. Soon bystanders begin to shout at Chauvin for him to get off of
Floyd, with statements ranging from pleas to confrontational taunting, but Chauvin largely
ignores them while officer Thao got between them and Chauvin, physically preventing any of
them from interfering. Floyd’s last words are “Please. Please. Please.” before he loses
consciousness. Chauvin does not get up and none of the officers present attempt to bring Floyd
back to consciousness. Eventually EMS arrives, but it is another minute before Chauvin gets off
of Floyd’s neck. By the time Floyd is loaded into a transport truck he has no pulse and is later
pronounced dead.
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Minneapolis Uprising
Early in the morning the following day, a spokesperson for the Minneapolis Police
department released a statement regarding reports of a man dying while in police custody. This
statement described the Floyd’s death as the result of someone suffering “medical distress” while
“resisting arrest” (Mannix, 2020). But only a few hours later, Darnella Frazier, a 17-year-old
bystander during Floyd’s killing, uploaded a video recording she took of the “incident” in
question to her personal Facebook page. The response to this post was immediate and swift,
pointing out how the official police statement did not at all do justice to what the video showed.
Council Member Jeremy Schroeder said
It is deeply concerning that the information initially circulated by the Minneapolis Police
Department early Tuesday morning did not fully reflect the horrifying circumstances
surrounding George Floyd’s death...The original news release did not in my view
accurately convey the facts or the role of the officers in this tragedy. (Mannix, 2020)
Mary Moriarty, chief public defender in Hennepin County, said ““Am I at all surprised that the
police lied in their report? No...We look at bodycam, we look at dashcam, and we frequently see
officers put their knees in a client’s back or neck...And it is troubling. It’s extremely troubling.”
(Mannix, 2020). Meanwhile, Minneapolis Police Chief Medaria Arradondo denied knowing
about the content of the official press release, while the police spokesperson, John Eldar, said
that the situation is fluid and that information released quickly can sometimes later be shown to
be incorrect. But in light of Moriarty’s comments, these statements by the police chief and
spokesperson did little to suppress the feeling that the police had deliberately misrepresented the
situation for the sole purpose of controlling the narrative surrounding Floyd’s death. For
example, Frazier posted again early in the morning on May 26, saying “Medical incident???
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Watch outtt they killed him and the proof is clearlyyyy there !!” (Frazier, 2020). Many
comments expressed a similar sentiment, with one user saying “They should be told to do a
retraction and report the real cause of death! Sickening!,” or another saying “Here we go again
“COVERUP”.”
In response to this statement and the uploading of Frazier’s video, a memorial was set up
outside of the CUP foods where Floyd had been killed, and as the number of people at the
memorial grew, the greater they felt they needed to demand justice for Floyd. As night fell,
protestors at the memorial began marching toward the Minneapolis Police Department's third
precinct police station, where the four involved officers were primarily stationed. While this
march was peaceful, as the night went on and the majority of the protestors began returning
home, a group of the remaining protestors began to vandalize the surrounding area and buildings.
In an attempt to keep the peace, police officers fired tear gas and rubber bullets at the crowd in
order to disperse them. But this action was done indiscriminately, resulting in many innocent
protestors being gassed or struck with less-lethal bullets. This set off 3 nights of intense violence
and destruction throughout the city, but particularly concentrated on Lake Street south of
downtown. Over the course of this time, over 100 buildings were completely destroyed,
including the destruction and looting of a Target and the burning down of the third precinct
police station. Images circulated endlessly, of destroyed cars, burned buildings, rubble, and
protestors celebrating and taking trophies from the precinct.
President Trump described the scene as a “a total lack of leadership” that would require
the mayor to either “get his act together” or else Trump would use military force (HennessyFiske & Etehad, 2020). He also called the protestors “thugs” and threatened “when the looting
starts, the shooting starts” (Press, 2020). All of this together mobilizes an affective economy of
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negativity surrounding this event1 that should have cemented it as “bad,” something not worthy
of support. Yet even after images of the uprising circulated worldwide, people continued to view
the killing of Floyd as a reprehensible structural failing, and the images of the “rioting and
looting” did not seem to deter many people who would become involved in the protests as they
grew. As reported by Luke Mogelson of The New Yorker, though many of the protestors “had not
committed any crimes, they recognized the political utility of such conduct” (Mogelson, 2020),
directly referring to the destructive actions of some of the protestors. But the idea that the violent
images of the uprising completely overshadowed the message of the protest is unwarranted, for
Mogelson reports
You could sense the unprecedented extent to which Floyd’s death, compared with
previous police killings of African-Americans, had unsettled white Americans. Soccer
moms wept openly, old hippies burned sage, and white parents kneeled with their
children before the spot where Floyd was killed. (Mogelson, 2020)
From this view, protestors, and even white people not involved in the protest itself, were able to
conceptually draw a line between the violent images of the uprising and the message of that
uprising. Why this happened, and how these images managed to become interpreted in the way
that they were is what is of concern to me here. Why did Floyd become a motivating image, and
why didn’t the images of destruction from the uprising undercut the calls for justice?
Violence and rhetoric
The relation between rhetoric and violence is a bit fraught. Aristotle went to great pains
to articulate the difference between the use of violence and rhetoric (Foley, 2013) but ultimately

1

I am calling it “The Minneapolis Uprising,” but the alternative title for it according to Wikipedia is “The Minneapolis Riot”
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located it in the aporia of internal conflict between will and desire. However, if rhetoric is “the
ability in any particular case to see the available means of persuasion” (Aristotle & McKeon,
1941, p. 1329) then the exclusion of violence as text seems tenuous at best. Craig Hosterman
(1978) quotes Symbionese Liberation Army member Nancy Ling Perry in saying “to those who
would bear the hopes and future of the people, let the voice of their guns express the words of
freedom” implying that the guns carry a message with them, both in their image and in the threat
that they pose (and thus in the execution of that threat there is rhetorical force). Hosterman
continues, “...it would appear that the real effect of aggression flows not from the power it
applies but from the message it carries” (Hosterman, 1978, p. 9). I agree with this view that
violence is more than just the act of violence; it carries messages. Those messages can vary
depending on context, from the violence of state oppression against subjugated groups to the
violence between two lovers in a consensual sadomasochistic relationship, and as such it is a
matter of listening and interpretation in order to understand them.
Hosterman offers several functions of violence that he feels allow violence to speak and
calls for the development of a “significant body of literature” (1978, p. 19) to help us better
comprehend and deal with rhetorical violence in the future. This call has subsequently been
taken up by rhetorical scholars of differing traditions. Gorsevski & Butterworth (2011) frame
Muhammed Ali’s nonviolent rhetoric/activism as being informed by the violence he displayed in
the ring. It was the ever-present potential for violence to exceed the confines of the ring that
resituated the conditions of his nonviolence. Here, directed, “symbolic” violence shifts the field
of discourse for nonviolent social movements. The commitment to nonviolence applies to the
changing of social or legal strictures, rather than an excision of all violence as legitimate political
action. Boshoff (2013) looks specifically at the rhetoric of violence inherent to our ostensibly
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neutral legal system and problematizes the kinds of solutions that can be uncovered when
operating under this kind of linguistic framework. Kevin Michael DeLuca and Jennifer Peeples
(2002) consider how a change in the nature of public discourse can change how the messages of
violent acts are perceived, especially within the context of political social movements.
One aim of this project is to engage with this literature by considering the unintended
messages of violence. More specifically, I will be engaging with the excess of rhetorical violence
and the failures of acts of violence to control their own messages. Just like in the case of Emmett
Till (Harold & DeLuca, 2005), the intended messages of the text do not always become the
dominant messages for society at large. Emmett Till’s death, despite its gruesomeness, was
nothing new for the Jim Crow South. As such, the actions of Roy Bryant and J.W. Milam2 were
meant to be read as a warning to the Black community about exceeding their proper place within
the racial hierarchy of the South. But this message, like all messages, could not be entirely
controlled as evidenced by the actions of Mamie Till Bradley. By refusing to put Emmett’s body
“in its place” (Harold and DeLuca, 2005, p. 271) she transformed him from being a victim of
racial oppression to “an unforgettable symbol that mobilized a generation of activists” (p. 271).
Jay P. Childers identifies this kind of orienting image or event as a focusing event, defining it as
“a shocking and sudden instance of violence that becomes immediately salient for a community,
highlight[ing] particular issues for the public’s agenda, and has the potential to lead to policy
change” (Childers, 2016, p. 574). I think this description adequately captures my views of the
image of Floyd’s death and the subsequent uprising it sparked. What I want to know is why was
Floyd’s image able to become a “focusing event” at all? Why wasn’t the intended message the
dominant message in relation to Floyd? Why weren’t conservative voices able to successfully

2

And perhaps others (Tell, 2017).
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frame Floyd’s death as inconsequential? And what connections did this build for the presentation
of the Minneapolis uprising?
“Oh, I don’t see race...”
Floyd was cast as an imperfect victim, and destruction of property historically alienates
white audiences from the plight of civil rights movements. Both negative elements should have
been enough to contain and quiet the message, keeping it an issue of local politics. But that did
not happen, and the operative question is “why?” While there were many factors at play
including the lack of real leadership in the face of a world-wide pandemic and the utilization of
Black Marxist rhetoric by BLM, I would like to look at the rhetorical elements of the video of
Floyd’s killing itself, as well as images of the Minneapolis uprising and its connection to Floyd.
Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites take a nuanced position in relation to violence
and images. They see the position that images can only carry meaning within an organization of
knowledge as being too structural and logocentric. Instead, they advocate for a kind of reading of
images which emphasizes the “interaction of the several layers of signification that comprise
photographic practices” (Hariman & Lucaites, 2016, p. 269). Rather than look for the one
inherent meaning in an image, one can instead look at the specific “shifts in meaning” as the
message of an image is passed from one media and medium to the next. And what’s more, visual
images are unstable articulations, and their circulation inevitably leads to interpretations and
readings that can include but also exceed their ideological constraints. While they do not spell
out all the ways in which this can happen, they argue that at least one way it does is through the
image of pain and suffering. Of course, pain and suffering must fit within an overall cultural
narrative, they must be “seen” as such, but once they do, they can speak with such force that
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“deep assumptions regarding how one’s life is patterned and what the future should hold”
(Hariman & Lucaites, 2016, p. 273) become disrupted, leaving open the possibility of change.
By searching for and analyzing those shifts of meaning, Hariman and Lucaites are able to
make claims regarding the meaning and impact of images on a large scale. And while they are
attempting to get away from a strict structuralist interpretation of images, it seems at times that a
structuralist interpretation is required for their positions to make sense. For instance, when
describing the image of “accidental napalm,” they say “[t]he photograph projects her pain into
our world...Her pain, like all great pain, disrupts and breaks up the social world’s pattern of
assurances” (p. 272). And “It is a picture that shouldn’t be shown of an event that shouldn’t have
happened...” (p. 272). Continuing, “[s]imple vulnerability, particularly as it is symbolized by
nakedness, puts us in an elemental moral situation” (p. 273). These statements seem to be
grounded in the idea that there are certain fundamental communications that can happen between
people, one of which is pain and vulnerability, that defy social construction. It is not that what
we understand as pain is given to us, but rather that pain can be read on a face or a body, and that
reading can rupture the very organization of knowledge that would have erased that pain in the
first place. How else could we talk about “an elemental moral situation”? This is why they can
quote Jon Caputo in saying “Obligation happens,” (p. 273) for there are some images and
messages that for Hariman and Lucaites indeed carry obligation in them from the start.
The idea that something like “pain” or “nakedness” could carry obligation with it is
mostly a correct assumption, but it treats a contingent response as if it is universal. While it
initially seems cynical, history bears out that in fact there is no obligation hidden inside images
of pain. Even images of pain in the most innocent or vulnerable subjects are absolutely no
guarantee of any feeling like obligation on the part of the viewer. Emmett Till’s image may have
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mobilized a movement, but there was an industry and market for images and souvenirs of
lynching victims.
It might seem perfectly normal to think that the communication of human emotions
would carry with them some kind of universal meaning; that a smiling face means joy, or a
crying face means sadness (broadly of course), and perhaps to a certain extent this is correct. But
this is not what Hariman and Lucaites are arguing. They are saying that these communications
are more than just the brute fact of emotion or sensation felt, they are saying these
communications carry a larger meaning and obligation with them, an obligation that impresses
itself upon us. However, Christine Harold and Kevin Michael DeLuca would challenge this point
explicitly.
To be clear, Harold and DeLuca agree that bodies in peril can do rhetorical work. Their
position is stated clearly that “bodies...moved a nation” (Harold & DeLuca, 2005, p. 267). Yet
how this happens is what they are contesting. It is not the case that images of violence move
people to want social change purely, rather images of violence have to first be read as “violence”
at all. Citing lynching postcards and photos (primarily from the book Without Sanctuary), they
argue that images of violence fit within larger narratives that prefigure the meaning of that
violence. And for some bodies, being subjected to violence only serves to strengthen the
existence of power structures. For the dominant white group, lynchings tell them that they are
indeed at the top of the racial order. For the oppressed Black group, it tells them that at any
moment their existence can be converted into the kind of rhetorical text that speaks for white
hegemony. That is, they can be killed publicly and without recourse at any moment for no other
reason than they are Black. This reading is supported by the fact that lynchings, while generally
understood as mob retaliation for Black transgressions (or perceived Black transgressions),
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would also happen in the absence of a transgression, perhaps even because of the absence of a
transgression. One “likely lynch mob participant” from Without Sanctuary is quoted as justifying
a recent lynching with “Oh, because he was a nigger. And he was the best nigger in town. Why,
he would even take off his hat to me” (Harold & DeLuca, 2005, p. 269). Within these contexts,
violence done against Black people was not violence that incites obligation, but rather a
necessary social action that invigorated and maintained social order.
With this larger narrative structure in hand, violence done against Black bodies was over
determined and fit squarely within white supremacist logic. It cannot be the case that there is
some human core that is touched when images of violence or suffering are seen. And yet, images
of violence and suffering can move people. This is without question, and it is the uncertainty of
predicting social responses to images of violence that demands for these images to be understood
as rhetorical texts. And like all rhetorical texts the authors cannot account for all the ways in
which meaning will be derived from that text. In the case of Emmett Till, the message meant to
be conveyed through his killing was taken and transformed into a condemnation of the
oppressive racial structure of the United States. While the intent of Bryant and Milam was to
reinforce racial power structures, the actions of Mamie Till Bradley (Emmett’s mother) changed
that message into a condemnation of a society that would allow that structure to exist at all. And
this condemnation galvanized a fight for change, giving motivation to a fledgling civil rights
movement at a time when its support was in question. As Harold and DeLuca explain,
By moving Emmett Till’s corpse from a muddy river bottom in the Mississippi Delta to a
public exhibition in urban Chicago, Mamie Till Bradley transformed her son from a
victim of White racism to an unforgettable symbol that mobilized a generation of
activists. (Harold & DeLuca, 2005, p. 271)
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But what did this movement of the body have to do with the transformation of the
image? As they argue, by the 1950s lynchings had moved from being the large, carnival-esque
affairs of the past, to a kind of hidden social rebalancing. While they were not for public
consumption, through a process of “performance chaining” (p. 269) lynchings could be unseen
and unspoken, and still serve the larger social function of maintaining the racial order, erasing
them as acts demanding social change. But by Mamie Till Bradley moving the body of her son
from the mudbank of a Mississippi river to Chicago, by her insistence on an open casket, by her
allowance of the publication of photos of her son in Jet, she changed the context in which the
text of violence was meant to be read. Rather than being read within the understood narrative
structure of racial order, the public display of that violence defied that structure and changed the
meaning of the text, of the body itself. No longer read as a proper action meant to support an
accepted way of life, the text was seen as a brutal, hate-fueled murder of an innocent child. And
with this defiant reading of the text came new demands and obligations felt from that text. Under
this reading, bodies can have demands and obligations that come from them, but they must first
be understood as speaking something that requires change in the first place. It is not enough to
present images of suffering and violence to motivate social change, it must be understood outside
of the structure in which that violence and suffering currently are epistemologically grounded.
Floyd was killed by agents of the state as he was being apprehended for suspicion of a
crime. These facts alone cannot account for the response that his killing received, because these
facts all fit within larger narratives about Black men. bell hooks has argued that Black men are
seen as “barbaric masculinity and uncivilized bestiality,” (Hooks, 1992) views that are not
(entirely) contradicted by the image of his killing. Furthermore, while Davi Johnson has
presented images from the Birmingham demonstrations as changing social opinions about the
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civil rights movement and therefore served as icons for the movement for the society at large, the
situation is much different for Floyd. While the children in Birmingham were also victims of
state violence, and egregiously so, their identification as children is what, Johnson argues,
allowed white audiences to identify with them. These were little children being attacked by dogs
and sprayed with fire hoses, and images of these children served as a “hermeneutic axis” (p. 60)
that undid dominant narratives of the protests and the civil rights movement at large. Floyd has
no such position to fall back on. He is not a child, he is a grown man accused of committing a
crime, accused of being on drugs, and accused of resisting arrest. The children could be read as
martyrs, “willing to sacrifice their very bodies for the sake of racial justice and social
transformation” (Johnson, 2005, p. 61), Floyd was doing no such thing. He was not resisting
authority in connection with a larger civil rights movement, he was simply buying cigarettes at a
convenience store3. Johnson quotes Jessie Jackson in saying that the reason society at large will
intervene in some injustices and not others is because of visibility, stating “When people can see,
our humanity transcends our politics” (Johnson, 2005, p. 63). But this quote requires that we give
a generous reading to it for it to ring true. It is not that people must “see” violence and injustice
but must see it in ways that cannot be made to fall back into dominant narratives that
contextualize that violence. They must “see” it, but with new eyes.
So how then were “new eyes” put on Floyd? If his death was within the dominant
narrative, if his body did not resist that narrative, and if images of violence are not of themselves
resistant to violence, what theoretical ground do we have to stand on to make sense of what
happened? Furthermore, how can I make any kind of claim about “new eyes” given that his

3

Not that this should undermine his victimhood, but rather his death is not immediately connected with a moral action or
organization, which should theoretically hurt his position as a formative image.
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death was like so many others? The answer that I will give is that there is a kind of viewing
which we take responsibility for, called witnessing. When we take this responsibility, we
retroactively take on the obligation of having been witness to the moment in question. This kind
of viewing can be brought upon an individual through any number of avenues, but for this
project I will be looking at how affect plays a role in transforming the viewer into a witness.
Affect
While Harold and DeLuca can point to changes in location as grounding transformations
of interpretation, I plan to go a different route. While encountering the images of Floyd’s death,
or the after images of the uprising can alter how we interpret them, I need to account for how it is
that the “new interpretation,” “new eyes,” or event of “witnessing” motivates action. For
example, a transformation in interpretation might alter my understanding of a tragic event from
one of accident to one of negligence. But this, by itself, does not account for why I would then
feel motivated to go out and protest for laws that outlaw negligent behavior. Something about the
image, when seen as negligent, must accumulate motivating affect to the point that I feel
obligation. Stephanie Hartzell (2020), when presenting the mobilization of positive affect that
has been stuck to the term “white nationalist”, gives us a situation in which it is not enough to
just present a new term or a new frame of reference. That new term or frame must be invested or
accumulate positive affect in order for people to desire connecting with it (to use that term
crudely here). In the same way, the images of Floyd and the uprising must mobilize affect in
such a way that, even culturally, they are seen as motivating audiences to act.
Affect can be understood only from within the messiness of experience and embodiment.
From this starting position, affect is concerned with how we affect things and how things affect
us. Take a look at your hand; someone could ask you “what is a hand?” and besides indexically
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holding it up, what can you say that captures the essence of that hand? Is it the number of fingers
you have? The existence of a palm? What about its ability to grab or manipulate things? At each
turn you are faced with the fact that your definition will fall short of the truth of your hand. But
the problem runs deeper still; even if you described your hand entirely, is this really what it
means to have a hand? Of course not, because hands are not objects that sit on the end of our
arms, they are a part of who we are, they are invested in our goals and intentions and can shift
from being practically forgotten to encapsulating our entire mode of being.
Affect concerns itself with becoming and possibilities. To ask a question like “what is a
hand?” for affect theorists, would be better asked as “what can a hand do?” Our bodies, rather
than being limited by biological matter, extend beyond our physical selves into a “bodily
horizon” of possibilities. An ephemeral aura born out of “can” and instantiated through action. It
is within and out of this aura that we affect the world around us. But just as our horizon extends
itself to the world around us, so too does the world extend to us. Everyday objects also exist as
possibilities, with the ever present “can” waiting just on the periphery of our cognizance. Rather
than existing as an object in-itself, the things around us connect and touch us in an embodied and
historical way. There are objects that we connect with that are special, that have more meaning
than their form allows for, that carry with them stories or remembrances of times passed. All of
these moments get stuck to the object and affect us as we connect with them. This is how Ahmed
is able to describe objects as being “sticky,” in that they “are already attributed as being good or
bad, as being the cause of happiness or unhappiness” (Ahmed, 2010). Not to say that these
objects inherently contain these states or affective impressions within them, but rather the point
is to bring attention to the fact that objects are never “just” objects for us, but are caught up in
our modes of being, and as we affect the world the world affects us.
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Within affect theory, the relationship between affect and emotions is contested. For some,
affect resides in a pre-linguistic, pre-cognitive mode of experience that allows for our subjective
sense of emotions to play out. These kinds of theories usually associate affect with a theory of
consciousness that accepts experiences that lie below the threshold of intentional cognition, yet
still inform our decisions. From this vantage point, emotions must be kept separate from affect,
for to collapse the two would be to completely dissolve affect as a concept entirely. Ahmed does
not see the situation this way, although her position requires a re-thinking of emotions. For
Ahmed, emotions are not private experiences generated within the individual that then slip out to
be read or operate within the world; they are instead produced through their circulation. The
individual is just one node within the circulating life of a sign or emotion. For some objects and
signs, the more they are circulated, the more affective value they accumulate and the more affect
they appear to contain.
“In such affective economies, emotions do things,” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 119), those things
including constructing individuals and communities by sticking together ideas and people to give
the effect of a collective group. So, while it is not the case that emotions reside within a specific
subject, they do cover over this fact and work to bind subjects or individuals together. Or as she
says, “the nonresidence of emotions is what makes them ‘binding’” (p. 119). And just as affect
does not reside in the individual, so too does it not reside in the object. Both “subject” and
“object” merely form the ground on which the circulation of a sign can happen, and it is out of
this circulation that affect is produced. In making this point, Ahmed presents an alternative
phrasing, stating “feelings appear in objects, or indeed as objects with a life of their own, only by
the concealment of how they are shaped by histories, including histories of production (labor and
labor time), as well as circulation or exchange.” (p. 120-1) From this re-statement, it seems fair
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to say that Ahmed does not draw a clear distinction between affect and emotion, rather it seems
as if the two terms are interchangeable. Reading her in this way allows us to interpret claims like,
“affective economies need to be seen as social and material, as well as psychic” as speaking also
about emotions.
Deleuze and Guattari describe affect as discursive “excess,” for communication always
produces and contains more than the author intended (Marinelli, 2019). This excess cannot be
fully accounted for but as Ahmed argues, there is a connection between this excess and our
emotions. I will be relying on this connection in arguing for the affective exchange that occurs
during viewing Floyd’s murder, though I will not claim that emotions and affect are identical. It
is useful to establish the connection between affect and emotion as emotional expression can
become an indicator for affective exchange, but I will be treating affect in a way that identifies it
more with change than state of being. Brian Massumi (1995) identifies intensity with affect,
arguing that it is shifts in intensity that articulate the flow of affect, and this is how I will be
understanding the concept. Emotion is a state of being, but the shifts between the felt and
expressed intensity of these states of being is a matter of affective accumulation and exchange.
When the intensity of a moment exceeds its threshold, there is a shift in the affective relation
between the subjects and objects within that moment. Though not exclusively, by looking for and
justifying the exceeding of emotional thresholds, I will be able to articulate clearly where I find
affect moving. This will provide me with a method by which I can identify and trace an affective
economy within a given situation. From this we will be able to ground an affective analysis in
the embodied moment of a given situation, which keeps affect within the realm of the body and
expression, and therefore within socially exchanged.
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Chapters
Chapter one has been focused on providing necessary historical and social context for
understanding the images of Floyd’s death and the uprising. By considering Floyd’s death
historically, we can better see both how his death was not unique, and yet sparked a movement
that spread all over the world. This puts us in a great position to better weigh the question
“how?” How did this happen, and what was it about Floyd and about the Minneapolis uprising
that made this the killing, and this the protest, that took hold?
By having briefly considered visuality and affect, we are in a position to look at the
image of Floyd more closely and analyze to what extent affect played a role in creating witnesses
of his murder. Chapter two begins with a short consideration of context regarding Black death in
Minneapolis, before diving into a more thorough treatment of witnessing. From here we then
look at visuality in relation to race to see the relation between the social utility of Black death
and the ways that hegemonic culture attempts to divest itself of the responsibility for that death.
We then look at the video of Floyd’s death directly, tracing the ways in which affective elements
operate to challenge the viewer into a state of epistemological aporia from which witnessing can
occur.
Chapter three begins with an outlining of how the elements of chapter two relate to the
argument of chapter three. Following another brief description of the visual elements of the
Minneapolis uprising, we then look at the history of social movement rhetoric conceptually to
see what theoretical tools we can use to make sense of the protest itself. After establishing a
framework from which to analyze the protestors statements, we can then look towards the protest
itself. By relying on recorded interviews with protestors during the protest, we can see the ways
in which they not only construct their position using language, but also see the ways in which the
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violence of the protest can be read in the environment while it is happening. It is the
interconnected and complex nature of the affective and historical construction of justification and
the use of violence that I argue contributed to the success of the uprising, despite their portrayal
in the media.
But even if the Minneapolis protest served as an anchor onto which other protests linked,
the fact remains that the moment of the protestors did not last. Chapter four reminds the reader of
the limits of violence as rhetorical device, considering how the protests and by extension BLM
lost much of their new gained support in the United States in the weeks following the uprising.
Of course, this cannot be reduced to a single causal factor, but data shows that part of the reason
for this decline in support stemmed from a mistaken belief that the vast majority of the protests
in support of Floyd had been violent.
With this in mind, I then go on to summarize the main findings of this project before
considering both extensions and limitations to the project. The limitations in particular are
separated into limitations of technicality and limitations of ethical investigation. Limitations of
technicality are understandable, but the limitations of ethical investigation are more fundamental
and less forgiving. I acknowledge the difficulty many might have with a project of this kind, but
by way of anecdote I attempt to explain my reasoning and rationale for continuing this study
despite (or in conjunction with) this criticism.
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Chapter 2
Introduction
While data indicates that American’s largely viewed the uprising as a response to both
the injustice done to Floyd as well as a history of abusive behavior towards Black communities
in Minneapolis (Parker et al., 2020), this history was already established, and it was the event of
Floyd’s killing that brought a focus to it. A resident of Minneapolis and protestor, Anthony
Mendoza, described his response, “I’m incredibly angry, frustrated. Sad. It feels just like the
fabric of the community was just ripped apart by what happened last Monday, and our political
leadership is failing us.” (Reporter, 2020). Yet the events of May 25, 2020 were only the most
recent in a long line of Black death at the hands of state authorities both across the country and in
Minneapolis. In 2015, Jamar Clark was shot and killed by police in North Minneapolis. No one
was charged in his death. In 2016, Philando Castile was shot during a traffic stop after informing
the officer present that he legally owned a weapon. Castile’s death was particularly tragic in that
his girlfriend and daughter were both in the car with him, and the girlfriend, Diamon Reynolds,
live-streamed his last moments. In the stream viewers are able to see not only Castile slowly
dying in front of his family, but we can also see the officer still holding his gun and pointing it at
Reynolds and daughter in the back seat. Reynolds handcuffed and detained while Castile’s body
lay in the car. The officer in question, Jeronimo Yanez, was charged with manslaughter but was
acquitted. In 2018, Thurman Blevins was shot multiple times and killed in North Minneapolis
while running away from police and shouting “Please, don’t shoot me! Leave me alone! Leave
me alone!” (Mogelson, 2020). The county prosecutor said there was no basis for criminal
charges against any of the officers involved. All the victims in these cases were Black, and in
each case the state upheld the belief that Black lives are expendable. Couple this with the 2017
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shooting case of Justine Damond, in which a Black officer shot an unarmed white woman and
was quickly put on leave pending an investigation before being charged and found guilty of
murder, and one can see a longer story in which Black lives are always condemned and inviting
of violence, while white lives must be ever vigilant against the evil of blackness.
With this history in mind, the statement made by Mendoza, and the mindset out of which
it was born, can only be held by those who are ignorant of the precarity of Black existence. The
idea that it was the discrete actions on that day that ripped apart the “fabric of the community”
implies that there was a united community to begin with, that there was a “normal” through
which everyone living in Minneapolis experienced their lives, and it was the violation of this
expectation through violence and brutality that ruptured this peace. Mendoza says he feels
“angry”, “frustrated”, and “sad” in response to this violation, which are fair responses, but that
this event is what made him aware of the kinds of oppression suffered by Black people living in
Minneapolis speaks to the chasm that exists between the experiences of those seen as
“belonging” and those who are considered “other”.
But one must be fair when evaluating the statements of others, and critiquing the kind of
response given by Mendoza solely because of its lack of historical knowledge or awareness of
the plight of Black Americans would not do justice to the position. While this position is
historically ignorant, it expresses a connection felt between Floyd and the viewer. That Mendoza
felt anything at all is significant, especially considering who Floyd was and who was responsible
for his death. As will be addressed, images of Black death (and Black death itself) in America
have a genealogy that moves from approval to unstated approval to obfuscation. The afterlife of
slavery has led to a situation in which “lynching” is over-defined to the point of uselessness.
What counts as a lynching becomes a matter of form more than anything else which has resulted
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in many cases where the event is read as a tragedy rather than another node in a long line of
historic racial injustice.
Floyd’s death as I will argue fits this script, yet his death and suffering were legible. How
is it that Floyd was seen, while so many others were not? To address this, I will first discuss
witnessing and its position as a critical concept and tool, before then discussing lynching in the
United States and how it manages to continue, but in hidden form. From there we will begin to
investigate how this hiddeness can be revealed through the Event, before finally looking at the
images surrounding George Floyd’s murder.
Witnessing
There is a cultural expectation that photographs and video give us “true-to-life”
representations, that they are a 1-to-1 transmission of what they present, but this is a myth
(Nichols, 1994, p. 29; Sturken & Cartwright, 2018). Video recordings have a sense or style about
them that communicates a position, just like any other communication; there can be no truly nonexistent or neutral position. For example, the person holding a camera makes decisions about
what is seen and what is left unseen, what to put into focus, where the viewfinder is pointed,
when the recording device is turned on, how long the device stays on and whether or not they
wish to include their own voice in the recording. Despite these subjective choices, the
presentation normalizes their point of view as the “truth” of the matter, while leaving everything
unseen as nonexistent and irrelevant. For example, in the case of police body camera footage, the
assumption that what is being viewed is unequivocally the truth has created a situation in which
the viewer is forced to keep in mind the subjectivity of the image, all while their senses reinforce
the idea that was is being seen is absolutely the truth (McKay & Lee, 2020). But often this state
of affairs is ignored and we treat photographs and videos as if they communicate only the facts,

28

as if they tell us what really happened. This leaves photography and video recording in a
precarious position regarding how they present the world; we treat their images as unvarnished
truth but in actuality there are myriad choices that lead up to the moment an image is captured,
and those choices are dependent on any number of social, cultural, and personal factors. This
situation is even more strained when we tie together the act of capture with the act of witnessing.
Witnessing occupies a precarious space regarding the act of looking. To see or view
something is an entirely different act than to “witness.” To claim to have witnessed something is
to say that something occurred, and that your recollection of that event “is” the case. This of
course creates what Sybille Kramer calls a “Janus-faced” problem for the witness, for they must
be both impersonal recorder of event, and personal experiencer of the event at the same time
(Kramer, 2015, p. 153). That is, the witness is expected to recall the event exactly as it occurred
without any interference from their subjectivity, but it is this very subjectivity that makes them a
subject with the ability to witness at all. Sascha Simons refers to this as the “veracity gap”
between an experience and the ability of the witness to convey that experience (Simons, 2018, p.
18) and is a matter of some signifigance for those who choose to focus on the act of witnessing
as their object of study or research. In his influential work on witnessing, John Durham Peters
describes the act as individuals acting as “surrogate sense organs of the absent” (Peters, 2001, p.
709), acknowledging that witnessing hinges on absence and on the subjectivity or “sense” of the
witness. This gap cannot be overcome by matter of logic or direct transferal, there will always
remain separation between the event, the witness to the event, and the audience to whom the
witness testifies. This is what Peters refers to when he says “[w]ords can be exchanged,
experiences cannot” (2001, p. 710). So it lies in the hands of the audience, the witness to the
witness, to make the leap of faith required for a witness to stand as such. The audience must trust

29

that the witness is conveying something that can be trusted or believed, that their experience of
the event can stand in for the truth of the matter. Of course, when this happens and under what
circumstances will vary depending on innumerable factors but the main thrust here is that a
witness requires belief even against the tension of their testimony. Simons says it eloquently,
“Put simply, witnesses need someone to trust them” (Simons, 2018, p.19).
This leads to an interesting situation in which we are left asking if the veracity gap exists
for the testimony of the witness and we generally take photographs and videos to be the (one and
only) truth, what happens when video and photography are offered as testimony; what happens
when images act as witness? On purely theoretical grounds, the situation is not really all that
different. As I’ve already argued, images also communicate positions; they speak from a point of
view and as such cannot be taken as 1-to-1 representations of the world or an event. But what
they can do is present a position as one that “is”, they can make real or legible a position that
otherwise would have been unseen or unknown. This does not undermine the naïve position of
taking images as truth, this still happens, but what it does do is widen the horizons of affectivity
for viewers of images even when they account for the subjectivity of the image.
This brings us to the affectivity of images as witness. How bodies become affected by
and affect bodies around them is complex and perhaps defies full articulation. Rather than
attempt to encapsulate the entire breadth of the concept, I only want to briefly talk about some of
the ways that this topic has been covered in the past. In 1996, John Fiske coined the term
“videolow” to describe the look and feel of video recordings made by everyday people to
document events. Videolow refers to images of lower quality, poor but close vantage points,
moments of loss of technical control, and reduced editing (Fiske, 1996, p. 159). All of these
factors contribute to what Fiske (1996) calls a “sense of authenticity” and which Simons (2018)
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calls “the aesthetics of authenticity”. Homemade videos or personal recordings are invested with
a kind of authenticity that causes their affectivity to register in different ways than more
mainstream media. In seeing the shaking of the camera and the nearness of the vantage point, we
are reminded that there are several positions from which an event can take place, challenging the
kind of omniscient point of view offered by mainstream video presentations (what Fiske calls the
“videohigh”). When we see the rawness and amateur-ness of the videolow, we register it as
authentic, and that authenticity comes with different affective investments. This registration can
have far reaching effects, as Sascha Simons argues “aesthetics of authenticity...can ignite an
affective, contagious force that is hard to predict and even harder to control” (Simons, 2018,
p.24).
The position of the witness is apriori uncertain, requiring the contingent moment of
“trust” to rise to the level of truth from which action can be taken. Images that participate in the
“aesthetics of authenticity”, rather than constraining the field of believable testimony, complicate
the situation further with their verifiable indexing of multiple points of view. This complication
opens up space for rhetorical and affective operation. With the shift towards acknowledging
authenticity within the aesthetic of the videolow there is a shift in how we orient ourselves in
response to video recordings of affectively moving events. Different theorists have approached
this situation from different perspectives and with different focuses. Sandra Ristovska looks at
strategic witnessing, arguing that we are shifting from “witnessing of to witnessing for” (2016, p.
1041) as the lens through which we can better understand the image witness, while Kerstin
Schankweiler borrows from Agamben and Fassin to triangulate testimony at the intersection of
the blood witness, the eye-witness, and the text as witness (Schankweiler, 2018). In this
formulation, witnessing happens within a layered structure of experience and visuality.
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Conceptually, the blood witness is different from the survivor in that the blood witness does not
survive their ordeal. The survivor, in surviving, is separated from the blood witness by the very
act of surviving. The blood witness as a concept then acts as an acknowledgment of the suffering
of those who are no longer able to articulate that suffering; the experience of the blood witness
does not die with them, it speaks from the silence left in their absence. And though this speaking
cannot express the full extent of their pain, it does speak, nonetheless. This is separate from the
eye-witness, who is able to be present in the moment of suffering or violation and then report
that experience to parties that were not present. The text as witness is meant to acknowledge that
certain forms of witnessing happen in the moment of experiencing the text itself.
There are instances where the inaccessibility of the blood witness, coupled with the
absence of eye-witnesses, can initially appear to contribute to a situation in which the event of
witnessing does not exist, but this situation is complicated by the existence of text. For example,
during the early- to mid-19th century, the lynching of Black bodies was a spectacle, a festival
referred to as a “barbeque” attended by men, women, and children from all over the town. But
the attendees-as-celebrants were the white members of whatever community was performing the
racial order at that moment. Though they saw the lynching, I would question to what extent they
are eye-witnesses in that what I would expect of them in witnessing, the taking on of obligation
in relation to what they saw, is non-existent. To witness a lynching as violation of human rights
and dignity cannot be if the act itself is not registered as violation but rather civic act4. But this is
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This is a pure theory claim in that it holds within the vacuum of theoretical speculation; it is logically consistent that one
cannot see a violation of human dignity if they believe their action supports the social structure that bestows and defends the
“human” in the first place. But as statements made by various attendees of lynchings make clear, it is not entirely certain the
nature of belief in lynching as civic duty. For instance, many newspapers and politicians presented the idea that there was a
difference between a “good” and a “bad” lynching, separated by the amount of needless suffering inflicted on the Black victim.
Good citizens and men of standing did good lynchings, while low-class men did bad lynchings. This of course was not true, but
the story existed, nevertheless. But for whom was this narrative crafted, what was the need for a “good” lynching in contrast to a
“bad” one? Obviously, there was utility, either personally or socially, in being able to separate ones actions from those of whom
they deemed inferior or of lower standing, but again we must ask why we would need to separate the actions in the first place? I
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where the text-as-witness can operate. To see images of these lynching is to encounter the
presence and absence of the blood witness. There, inscribed in and on the flesh, in the swollen
tongues and burned bodies of Black lives cut short, is born witness. But captured in an image, the
relationship between myself and the image bears witness. Text-as-witness is the relation born out
of my encounter with violation as captured in any manner of various mediums. As the text bears
witness, so am I challenged by what the text and the blood witness speak to me.
Within this positioning of blood witness, eye-witness, and text as witness, there exists the
possibility of ordering these terms hierarchically, but I want to be clear in challenging this
thinking. In reading my presentation here, there is a temptation to see the blood witness as most
believable as they experienced the event directly, then eye-witness as second, and text as witness
as third. But this is to treat witnessing too systematically. The fact is, the blood witness, the eyewitness, and the text as witness all require the “leap of faith” that is trust in order to register as
witness at all. Because of this, there is no reason to think of these different modes of witnessing
as in competition or ordered. Rather, one must look at each contingent expression of witnessing
to see the ways in which it is persuasive such that a third party takes the leap at all. This leaves
the terms in a shifting and unstable relationship with each other and the third party.
Considering the organization of blood witness, eye-witness, text as witness, the utility of
strategic witness, and what has already been stated regarding Fiske’s work with the aesthetics of
authenticity of the videolow, and it becomes clear that navigating the concept of the
witness/image is less a matter of definition and more a matter of utility. I only want to add here

would suggest that the reason for the demarcation here is that there were lynchings that went “too far”, that shook spectators, if
even for a moment, from their ideological commitment to civic duty, and challenged the epistemological framework from which
they operated. And this is supported in the reports from attendees collected in Without Sanctuary. I will not fully articulate the
idea here, I only offer this aside to clarify that while I do believe that one cannot both see an unjust and a just act simultaneously
as a logical necessity, the lived experience of individuals in the moment is not so cleanly separated.
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that because of the focus on utility, practicality, or contingency in making determinations about
witnessing, we must also consider the ways in which other factors can affect how we register
those contingencies. While I could not make an exhaustive list of what these factors are, for this
project we must seriously consider the ways in which race operates as a factor in registering
those contingent moments of “witnessing.”
Returning now to Floyd, I will need to utilize those aspects of witnessing and testimony
that I feel are evident in the image-as-text of his killing. Regarding some of the theory already
stated, I see elements of all the mentioned concepts in the Floyd video. In the case of the
aesthetics of authenticity and strategic journalism, Frazier intervened in public discourse
strategically so that her video was positioned critically towards the official narrative released by
the Minneapolis PD. While the official statement on the incident was intended to establish
reality, Frazier posted her video specifically to counter this reality. That is, her video seized on
the cultural notion that images and recordings portray the truth of what is real, and her video was
saturated with this reality, in part because of how it presents the aesthetics of authenticity
through the videolow. This means that from the very beginning, the image of Floyd’s murder as
contained within Frazier’s recording was already positioned in opposition to the story released
by the State, allowing it to operate as a text as witness, poised to mobilize bodies in response to
it. By introducing a kind of plurality of reality regarding what happened to Floyd, Frazier shifted
the image into a “witnessing for” in defense of Floyd and in condemnation of the MPD.
Schankweiler identifying the intersection of the blood witness, eye-witness, and text as
witness has important implications for Floyd as well. Within this organization, Floyd would
serve as blood witness, the crowd gathered around Floyd and Chauvin would serve as eyewitnesses, and Frazier’s video of Floyd’s killing would serve as text as witness in the moment of
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our watching it. Schankweiler argues that the blood witness is affectively connected to the
concept of the martyr, which has oppositional power in the case of Floyd. As Adam Ployd (2020)
has argued, there has been a hesitancy to construct Black victims of state oppression as martyrs,
with some figures even going so far as to use what he calls “no angel” rhetoric. This rhetoric
identifies that martyrs assume moral obligation in relation to their death, but then locates
martyrdom as a category separate from Black victims. It argues that these victims shouldn’t be
seen as martyrs because they were “no angels,” often citing their history of crime or ill-behavior
as proof of the claim. This kind of response to Black death has a long history in the United States
(Ore, 2019) and is often effective as Ployd makes clear. Yet in the case of Floyd, though this
rhetoric was marshalled as usual (Sullivan, 2021), it largely failed to divert public opinion or
international attention away from the spectacle of his death. Schankweiler might suggest that in
part, this failure occurred because the images produced around Floyd’s death positioned him as a
blood witness. But I would add that another element at play here would be a contested
occupation of eye-witness and text as witness. As a viewer of the video, I am not physically
present at the event of Floyd’s death and as such there is a difference between myself and the
crowd gathered outside the CUP foods watching and experiencing it. As such it must be the case
that I engage with Floyd’s murder through the text as witness. And yet, my experience of
watching the video is mirrored in the actions and reactions of the eye-witnesses of Floyd’s death,
as the intensities exchange within situation for them, they exchange for me as well. As they shout
and express horror and disbelief, I also express horror and disbelief. As such, my position as
separate witness through text is challenged by my shared reaction with the eye-witness. As such
my actual position is affectively in flux, which I argue also contributed to the failure of negative
constructions of Floyd to divest his images of the obligation of witnessing.
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Furthermore, Floyd’s position as blood witness/martyr conflicts with the “no angel”
rhetoric marshalled against him, adding another vector by which the idea of a “true event” is
contested. This contestation carries with it the mobilizing force of any event pregnant with affect,
though we must investigate the image itself to make clear (or to argue for) those nodes of
affective accumulation.
In this (all too brief) section, I have attempted to introduce the conceptual position of the
witness, and to try and understand how George Floyd, Darnella Frazier, and viewers of her video
fit into this conception. To see the image of Floyd is something, but to witness the image of
Floyd is another. If we take the act of testifying as that which attempts to convey the experience
of witnessing, then we can see Peters recognizes this sense when he says, “In testifying we must
take responsibility for what we once took little responsibility for” (Peters, 2001, p. 722).
However, accepting that one can become a witness through the image of Floyd conceptually still
has not quite gotten us to understanding how the affective elements of the image of his murder
mobilized a community. We recognize that we have witnessed something, but how have we
made sense of that something? What do we call it? And in what way has that conceptualization
played a part in the uprising and sentiments in reaction to that uprising?
Of hoods and lynchings
When asking about what connects and separates Floyd from Castille, Garner, Trayvon,
Bland, Taylor, or Rice (the list heartbreakingly goes on), we cannot do the investigation justice
without having a working knowledge of how lynching has operated in the United States and how
that operation still impacts our society today. A traditional understanding of lynching would look
something like the NAACP’s 1940 definition of the term, “A lynching is regarded as an activity
in which persons in defiance of the law administer punishment by death to an individual for an
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alleged offense or to an individual with whom some offence has been associated” (Waldrep,
2009, p. 169). This definition warrants itself historically, pulling from Charles Lynch’s actions
during and following the American revolutionary war (Shay, 1969; see also Cutler, 2019;
Rushdy, 2014). Lynch would gather large groups of men together to hunt down, capture, and
“try” people suspected of still being loyal to the British. The defining characteristic of the
“lynched person” was political commitment, rather than immutable trait.
But here is where Ersula Ore makes a critical intervention; she notes that from its
inception lynching was a communal act of policing citizenship and social order. It was celebrated
and it constructed an idea of citizenship that took the white man as the valiant citizen (as only
white people could be citizens, and only men were given the agency to exact a lynching). As
time passed the threat to American civic identity shifted from the Tory to the Black slave, as the
nation’s “social contract” was structured through omissions and these omissions were centered
on race. Social order was thus understood as a harmony between the superior class of whites and
the inferior class of Blacks. But when the actions the inferior class transgressed this expectation,
there was social crises as the “racial contract” had been violated. Separate from the social
contract, the racial contract is an understanding about the place of people in society based on
their “race” as a categorical label. According to philosopher Charles Mills the racial contract is a
“contract between those categorized as white over the nonwhites, who are thus the objects rather
than subjects of the agreement” in order to maintain “racial polity, a racial state, and a racial
judicial system” (Mills, 1997, p. 12-14). This contract became even more strained after the
country recognized Black people as citizens following the civil war. Therefore, from the time of
reconstruction onward, lynching became a way for white people to nullify the rights of Black
citizens through the enactment of racial terror. Rather than the race neutral definition, Ore argues
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that lynching was/is “a material and rhetorical performance that illustrates the mutually
constitutive relationship between democracy and antiblack violence” (Ore, 2019, p. 26).
In response to successful anti-lynching campaigns from activists like Ida B. Wells,
lynching acquired a negative labelling in polite society. By the early 20th century, lynching was
generally viewed as a barbaric act and unbecoming for a democratic society as it operated
outside of the constraints of the law. Yet the function of lynching, keeping Black people “in their
place” and away from civic power, was still necessary for sustaining the racial contract.
Therefore, lynching took on an unspoken, underground characteristic. It still happened, and
people knew that it did, but rather than being the large carnivalesque spectacles that they had
been in the late 19th century, they became quiet affairs, done under cover of darkness. The bodies
of lynched victims were often left in places where they would later be found, ensuring that the
message of racial oppression was still communicated, but the act itself became hidden.
It is not within the scope of this project to articulate all the ways in which this masking
(or rather, “hooding”) of lynching impacted American society and politics or the innumerable
effects it had on Black communities across the country and through time. What I can do is
attempt to show that this hooding split the act of lynching into two different conceptual schemas.
What will need to be kept in mind here is that one of these schemas is deliberately labelled as
“not lynching”. This is confusing by design, but it serves a necessary purpose in sustaining the
racial contract.
Within the historic move to a hooded lynching, these two schemas make themselves
known through the words and actions of those who hold power in relation to violent acts of racial
oppression. On the one side is the open acknowledgement of the evils of lynching, while on the
other are the actual acts that maintain the racial contract, though these acts are ostensibly
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separated from lynching itself5. To be clear, nearly everyone agrees that lynching as concept is
bad, but according to Ore lynching as act is in part necessary to sustain the idea of the American
citizen, meaning that though we reject the label we still accept the actions. Ore argues that this is
done partly through a restrictive defining of the act of lynching that makes it relatively useless as
a term. In other words, unless there is a rope and a tree, and a group of people in white cloaks
and hoods, it isn’t a lynching. This conception of a lynching persists despite the historic evidence
surrounding lynching (the majority of which did not involve hanging) and it allows the
continuation of actions that enforce the racial contract while simultaneously allowing for the
disavowal of those actions as lynchings, specifically because that term has attained “devil”
status.
What then becomes of witnessing when “lynching” is overdetermined to the point of
uselessness? How does one witness Black death when that death is pre-scripted as personal
failure rather than systematic outcome? We are left with a situation in which there cannot be a
blood witness, as there is no violating moment from which the blood witness speaks through
absence. There can be no eye-witness or text as witness, as there is nothing to see here, folks. Or
perhaps Black death as witnessed event becomes so contested that it becomes unrecognizable for
many who would otherwise feel obligated to act. And yet, there are moments where obligation,
against all odds and systems, is felt. Bodies are brought into relation with each other despite the
sedimented epistemological frameworks that would otherwise separate them. The question now
becomes how does this challenge arise?

For a better understanding of these acts, look to the 2016 report by the United Nations’ Working Group of Experts on People of
African Descent, in which they establish a clear link between contemporary killings of Black people by state agents and the
“racial terror lynchings of the past”. Citation in references.
5
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Event Horizon
The enactment of the hooding of lynching has placed us in a situation in which
“lynching” is reviled, while the actual actions and intentions of lynching are erased or redirected
so that they can continue. This contributes to an experience of two separate states of being for
people in the United States; one for whom “lynching” is a thing of the past, and the other for
whom lynching is ever present, ever threatening, and always ready to be explained away. Ore
describes this “explaining away” as a tradition that casts profiling Black bodies as chivalrous,
“...posits the conscious eradication of [B]lack life as an unfortunate, but nonetheless ugly,
consequence of supposed black delinquency and...uses racial terror as a means of policing the
boundaries between America’s white ‘us’ and its black ‘them’” (Ore, 2019, p. 10). This tradition,
though denied in word, must live on in action. For Ore, this living on of lynching has made a
home in the American criminal justice system. Ore locates the intersection of lynching and
police violence against Black bodies as “[T]he correlation between the denial of due process
under lynching and the denial of due process under antiblack policing” (p. 92), which ultimately
contributes to a larger political and cultural narrative of the disposing of Black life as civic duty.
By denying due process to Black people on account of their race, protecting abusive police
officers, and using the state to legitimate their actions, Ore concludes that the racist ideology that
informed lynchings in the past “...is the same racist ideology that informs and legitimates
America’s targeted eradication and incarceration of contemporary black citizens.” (p. 92) As
such it is the system of policing, enfleshed and executed in the figure of the police officer, which
carries forward the hooded lynching.
This tradition of lynching, this hooded lynching, runs interference when Black people are
killed at the hands of state agents. Since “lynching” is immediately understood as bad, if an act

40

of state sanctioned violence were to be registered as a lynching it would immediately be
condemned, so this hooding allows for the habits and procedures that most contribute to Black
death to continue unabated and unhindered by public opposition. Functionally, hooding a
lynching would involve actions and discourses that serve to obfuscate Black death as contingent
and isolated event. In terms of the visual, a hooded lynching would be events of Black death that
do not register as events linked with historic systems of oppression. Police killing of Black
people would be an example, but as was the case with Trayvon Martin, it does not need to be an
agent of the state. It requires that an individual act in such a way as to deprive Black individuals
of their freedom and autonomy based on assessments made about their race, and then to have
those actions defended as civic duty. The trick is to disrupt the connection between the history of
lynching and the current example of Black death. In short, “lynching” doesn’t happen anymore,
and hooded lynching is not legible.
But if Black death can fit a national script that pre-determines how it is publicly
understood, if hooded lynching can go undetected, how can the situation, the precarity of Black
life, be witnessed? I argue that, in the case of Floyd, this witnessing was enacted affectively,
born out of the singular Event of Black death. In his treatment of the possibility of dissent,
Kendall Phillips borrows from Foucault and other post-structuralist thinkers in describing the
Event as “that singular moment in which the space of dissension opens” and it is from the
“complex interplay of discourses, relations of power, and historical circumstances” (Phillips,
2015, p. 65) that dissent arises. That is, the Event is an experience or moment in which the
“discursive frameworks” that organize our words and thoughts are stripped of the cultural
investment we have given them, and this laying bare reveals them for the arbitrary constructions
that they are. Phillips describes this process as “harsh” and “traumatic,” becoming “difficult to
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conceptualize after its occurrence” (p. 65). Yet it is from this traumatic irruption that virtualities
are born. This can happen, at least in part, due to the incongruity between our experience and our
contingent cognition of that experience. As Phillips says, "It is within the gap between the
object—including our bodies—and the discursive frameworks through which we give them
meaning that the Event emerges” (Phillips, 2015, p. 65).
For Phillips, the question of dissent is not about solutions but rather thinking “thought” as
that which “embraces” disruption and “irresolvable difference” (p. 68). I will need to pervert this
aim a bit for my purposes. Rather than striving for thought, I am treating the Event as that
moment in which the sanctity of discursive frameworks is stripped away, leaving open the
possibility of understanding alternative frameworks. That is, it is through the Event that
previously unknown systems of thought or experience can become legible, and it is by way of
affective accumulation and transference that the opening of discursive horizons can be connected
to legibility. This position seems to be suggested in the literature; Stephen H. Browne argues that
violence (that is, bodily communication) can give rise to certain “interpretive possibilities” that
lend themselves to “inventional purposes” (Browne, 1996, p. 56), while Kevin DeLuca and
Jennifer Peeples say
Image events are dense surfaces meant to provoke in an instant the shock of the familiar
made strange. They suggest a Benjaminian sense of time, where any moment can open up
on eternity, any moment can be the moment that changes everything, the moment that
redeems the past and the future. And it is all there on the surface (DeLuca & Peeples,
2002, p. 144-5).
DeLuca again, with Christine Harold, on the brutal violence done to Emmett Till: “Like all
rhetorical texts, however, Milam and Bryant’s horrible message, inscribed on the body of young
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Emmett Till, could not be made to signify obediently what its authors demanded.” (Harold &
DeLuca, 2005, p. 271). In a nod to intensity, Courtney Baker says “it is the visibility of not only
death itself but also the cause of death that compounds the affective power of visual display”
(Baker, 2006, p. 115). Baker’s observation here is racially neutral, and therefore there will be
problems in translating it wholesale into the realm of Black bodies and Black death. But in
investigating the image of Floyd some headway can be made in this direction. For there seems to
be a connecting through line here that acknowledges the ability for violence as the incitation of
the Event to exceed its messaging and thrust viewers into a confrontation with disruption. The
audience experiences this Event through affective means, defying the ability to be explicitly
communicated (perhaps adding some explanatory power to Phillips' recognition of the Event’s
resistance to conceptualization) and as such horizons of cognition open up to that audience, even
against a framework like lynching.
History supplies us with examples of this exceeding of thresholds. In 1926, Crisis, the
official news distribution for the NAACP, published a picture of the lynched body of James
Clark (though he remained unnamed) along with the words “My Country ‘Tis of Thee Sweet
Land of Liberty--”. In the picture, Clark is seen in a dress shirt, straightened slacks, a belt, and
shoes that appear to shine. Through an act that is meant to position the civilized white citizen
against the savage and barbaric Black, this image and its accompanying title threaten to break
free from this construction. Clark, a thirty-eight-year-old husband and father of three, appeared
in stark contrast to the expected image he was meant to convey. He looked professional,
“respectable;” isn’t this how we all want to look when we step outside? Yet here he is, strung up
to a tree. As Baker pointed out, the cause of death can have affective power, and in this case the
cause was in contrast to the body as we could see. Bodies well-dressed are expected to be treated
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with a certain amount of decorum, but here was an extrajudicial, barbaric cause of death inflicted
on the finely dressed body. The incongruity disrupts general notions of who is “punished” with
lynching and what manner of person they must be, and the disruption accumulates affect as
readers are forced to re-examine what we understand by lynching and its victims. Crisis asked its
readers is this the kind of America we want to show to the rest of the world? Where citizens can
be executed and displayed for all to see, in an effort to maintain the racial social order? Is your
mental image of the Black brute still able to be maintained in the face of such an image? This is
what Crisis sought to force its readers into wrestling with, and in doing so force the larger
American society to confront.
Though he has been mentioned already in in this section and others, the 1955 lynching of
fourteen-year-old Emmett Till and the subsequent public display of his body by his mother is
another example of the power of the Event to disrupt discursive frameworks. And this is in spite
of the complications not only within the legal proceedings surrounding Till’s murder, but even in
the re-telling of the story itself. To be brief, questions like where Till was murdered, the time he
was abducted, or even how many killers were actually involved are still not known, and in fact
this uncertainty has even been capitalized and profited from (Tell, 2017). Nevertheless, it was the
actions of Till’s mother, Mamie Till-Bradley, that re-told the message intended by Till’s killers.
After fighting to have Emmett’s body returned to her from Mississippi to Chicago, Mrs. Till6
demanded to have an open-casket funeral without any retouching done to Emmett’s body.
Explaining her rational, she said

6

Born Mamie Elizabeth Carthan, Mamie Till-Bradley met and later married Louis Till in 1940, separating from him in 1942. She
married Pink Bradley in 1951, becoming “Mamie Till-Bradley", but they divorced in 1952. She then later married Gene Mobley
in 1957, becoming “Mamie Elizabeth Till-Mobley". In this paper, I have referred to her as “Till-Bradley” as that is the name used
in many of the first-hand accounts and sources about her, so it is a matter of clarity. But I wanted to acknowledge the story of her
name, as she became an activist following the murder of her son and for those who wish to learn more about her achievements it
would be most useful to know under what name she worked and labored.
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I knew that I could talk for the rest of my life about what had happened to my baby, I could
explain it in great detail, I could describe what I saw laid out there on that slab at A. A. Rayner’s,
one piece, one inch, one body part, at a time. I could do all of that and people still would not get
the full impact. They would not be able to visualize what had happened, unless they were
allowed to see the results of what had happened. They had to see what I had seen. The whole
nation had to bear witness to this (Till-Mobley & Benson, 2004).
Mrs. Till explicitly invokes witnessing in explaining her choice to publicly display what had
been done to her son. It is important for the world to “see what I had seen” and bear witness to
what had been done. And this witnessing cannot be done through careful description, because to
do so would be to visualize the scene. But to visualize is to cognize, to grasp within our minds a
scene using the concepts we have at our disposal. But to encounter the Event affectively is to
experience something beyond our concepts. It is in this beyond that affect moves and
accumulates and through this movement our ways of making sense begin to tremble. To see
Emmett is an affective moment, one that Mrs. Till argues cannot properly be grasped
cognitively.
In seeing the method of execution, Emmett’s body as blood witness is both silent where
he should speak and speaks despite being silenced. Further increasing the intensity of the
viewing moment; Emmett is only a child. With the story of his suffering inscribed on his skin,
viewers are caught up in the affective moment of epistemological challenge. The kind of
violence done against Emmett is shocking and certainly not the kind of thing that gets published
in a national newspaper or magazine, but by challenging this expectation Mrs. Till provides an
avenue through which viewers are confronted with the Event of Black death. The viewer, in
encountering the Event, in seeing the blood witness and child, in reading the pain and suffering
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inscribed in the method of Till’s murder, is brought into a relation with the image that pushes
them beyond the threshold of expectation.
Images of Emmett’s corpse were printed in The Chicago Defender and Jet magazine, and
the reaction was swift. Lerone Bennett, formerly of Jet magazine, told NPR’s Noah Adams that
“as soon as [the issue containing pictures of Till] hit the streets, people started lining up at
newsstands. Word spread from Chicago to Atlanta” (Bennett, 2004; Harold & DeLuca, 2005).
Harold and DeLuca argue that the images of Till’s murder galvanized a nascent civil rights
movement that ultimately became the “Civil Rights Movement” that we know today. And while
they prematurely describe the movement as that which “lynched lynching” (p. 282), the
sentiment that it was Emmett’s body and the intended disposability of his corpse that ultimately
confronted viewers with the Event necessary to read the precarity of the Black everyday can still
be understood.
“...Bound to Respect”7
The image of Floyd’s killing was a site of interpretive conflict and as such served as a
motivating text for protestors and non-protestors alike. This conflict arises from the discontinuity
between the intended message of the text as made by the police and the received message of that
text by the general public. In experiencing the irruption of cohesion, the arbitrariness of one’s
discursive framework is revealed, marking it as the threshold of the Event. And it is through the

7

I would like to briefly say something about my choice to not include any images in this thesis, despite the visual
being a main theme of discussion. Whether or not it is ethical to reproduce images of Black death in the context of
academic investigation is contested (Mowatt, 2018). One argument states that while seeing the images I am
describing carries with it its own phenomenological content, this contributes to a logic and history that treats Black
death as an object to be viewed, rendering non-visualized or non-reproducible Black death invisible. I have not
made up my mind on whether I fully agree with this position, but I do know that in researching for this project I
have had to delve into the visual history of lynching and the terrorizing of Black lives. And while I have the privilege
to say “I’ve had enough” regarding images of racial terrorism, I’ve had enough. I would not have had the strength
to finish this project if I also had to include images as well.
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transference and accumulation of affect that one moves from an initial framework to one that
was previously illegible.
The accumulation of positive affect regarding Floyd intersects at a couple vectors. First,
the length of time it took for Floyd to be killed, then the method and style by which he was
killed, next are the sounds that accompanied the killing. And lastly is the introduction of
abjectivity by way of force. For the sake of brevity, I will only be addressing a few expressions
of these vectors as there is no way one can exhaust the subject.
Chauvin knelt on Floyd’s neck for 8 minutes and 46 seconds (according to public
knowledge. The trial revealed that this number was incorrect, but this number took on a
significance beyond its literal meaning). When watching this video, it feels like an eternity. The
death of Eric Garner also involved a restriction of breathing, with Floyd echoing Garner’s pleas
in saying “I can’t breathe,” yet the amount of time we see “the chokehold” is very brief (Police
Shootings, 2016). For Freddie Gray and Sandra Bland, we do not see the moment of death, we
only experience its aftermath. For Philando Castille, while video of his shooting exists, it was the
Facebook livestream by his Girlfriend Diamond Reynolds that captured people’s attention, and
this video contained the aftermath of the shooting (worth national attention in its own right).
However, in each of these cases we either don’t see or can ignore the moment of death and in
doing so we create separation between ourselves and the conviction of injustice.
This isn’t to say that the moment of death needs to be seen for affect to transfer between
bodies, as Till’s case makes evident, but rather to say that the accumulation of affect must breach
a certain threshold before frameworks are challenged. In the case of Till, it was the reading of his
pain and suffering coupled with his age and the innocuous nature of his “crime” that burst
epistemological expectations. Of course, the murders of Castille, Grey, Bland, and countless
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others is affectively charged, but there is something of note in that the decisive moment of death
is not captured. And, just like the lynching images, when the Event of Black death is hidden from
view, there can be cultural interference that limits affective exchange. I do not mean to
“compare” Black death, instead I want to bring attention to the ways in which Black death
functions in a racist system. Till’s death touched on several nodes of affective transfer (age,
“crime,” suffering, unrecognizable body) such that the absence of the decisive moment does not
hinder the affective accumulation to threshold. But as time passes and audience expectations
change, what affects viewers will change with it.
But Floyd’s death was different. The length of time, 8:46, could not be ignored. As one
watches, the absurdity of what is being seen begins to compound on the viewer. As Floyd begins
to lose consciousness, the viewer becomes more and more conscious of the amount of time that
has passed. Floyd’s desperation can be identified with as we feel desperation in watching the
encounter. The “restraint” used by Chauvin was ostensibly to get Floyd under control, but this
claim strains credibility when the length of the restraint is considered. Floyd does not appear to
be resisting in the video, but even if this were the case this resisting would have stopped long
before he begins to lose consciousness. Yet the knee-on-the-neck remains. Even after Floyd
stops moving and closes his eyes, the hold remains in place. Even after EMS arrives, it is another
minute before Chauvin gets off of Floyd’s neck.
The stereotype of the Black beast or brute states that Black people, especially Black men,
are animalistic and savage by their very nature (The Brute Caricature - Jim Crow Museum,
2000). The ways in which ordinary (read white) people are constrained by social expectations do
not constrain the Black man because he cannot understand them and he is therefore dangerous
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and must be restrained and controlled. While certainly not the only factor in his treatment8, the
expectation that Floyd was more dangerous in part because of his Blackness fits into a larger
cultural narrative about Blackness and the need for the civilizing hand of whiteness. Yet this
narrative becomes unstable when we actually watch Floyd’s dying moments. He is not a danger,
he is not fighting, he is not out of control. He is crying, pleading for air, calling out to his mom
and shouting his love for his children. And then when he loses consciousness, at the point where
the danger of his Blackness would be rendered inert, the knee remains in place. What is being
restrained if not his danger? What is the message if not public safety? This epistemological
aporia finds no clean answers within the stereotypical framework.
The rising sense of helplessness experienced by the viewer and Floyd becomes more and
more acute, until the point of death. Regarding affective accumulation, this is a matter of
intensity. Brian Massumi describes intensity as “the strength or duration of the image’s effect”
(1995, p. 84-5), that is, the more intensely one experiences the moment of affective exchange,
the more one comes into relation with the affect surrounding and investing that exchange. For his
article, Massumi does not mind equating intensity with affect (p.88) and as such we can do the
same. The intensity of Floyd’s suffering and our connection to that suffering grows as the
seconds pass ever slower. Michael Richardson describes the connection of images and intensity
this way, “Images... not only show but also produce intensities and provoke bodies. [They] call
the viewing body into relation to them through the capacity to affect” (Richardson 2016, p. 75).
If it is through affect that the Event unfolds itself for us, then the experience of the rising

8

Floyd’s sex, physical size, and addiction status were all used in defense of Chauvin’s actions.
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intensity regarding the length of time of the video would become a central node of transmission
regarding interaction and discourse surrounding the video, and that is exactly what we find.
The length of the restraint became a focal point for many viewers from disparate
positions in society. Attendees at Floyd's memorial service in Minneapolis held a moment of
silence for 8 minutes and 46 seconds. Demonstrators in Boston staged “die-ins” where they
would lay down in the street, for 8 minutes and 46 seconds. Democratic senators took a knee in
the Emancipation hall for 8 minutes and 46 seconds (Hennessey, 2020). Dave Chappelle titled a
2020 performance special 8:46 in remembrance of Floyd. Even Bungie, a video game production
company, held an 8 minute and 46 second moment of silence before a livestream detailing the
next expansion of their game Destiny 2. This time became a way of indexing Black oppression
and police brutality merely by citing the ridiculous amount of time that Chauvin spent on Floyd’s
neck. The fact that the time was referenced and used in things from protests to memorials to TV
specials, the length of time was compelling in getting a general audience to understanding what
kinds of brutality Black people are struggling with.
The next aspect of the images that I would like to look at regard the method and style of
Floyd’s killing. In the pictures and in the video, Floyd is laying on his stomach with his hands
cuffed behind his back while officer Chauvin has his knees on the back of Floyd’s neck and his
lower back with his feet entirely off the ground. That is, Chauvin’s entire weight is on Floyd’s
neck and back. In cases where police use guns to kill people, the moment of death is usually over
quite quickly, with the implement of death being seen as an extension of the officer but still
distinct from them. But Chauvin’s knee is not seen as separate from him, as a mechanical
extension of his body; it is his body. The life that Chauvin snuffed out wasn’t “blinked” out of
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existence, his knee felt the passing. It is hard not to draw connections between the use of the
“knee” and the idea of killing with one’s “bare hands”.
Many of the articles in major news publications written about Chauvin were focused on
the exact location on Floyd’s body Chauvin had placed his knee, and academic articles have used
Chauvin’s knee as a metaphor for the plight of oppressed peoples all over the world (Bazian,
2020), but there is a lack of consideration regarding the message sent by the use of Chauvin’s
knee. Floyd’s body, lying prone on the ground, on a street by a curb like so many others, does
not immediately stand out as unordinary. Yet the restraint used by Chauvin, his whole weight
crushing down on Floyd’s neck and windpipe, excites a primordial sense of struggle. This is not
“use of force” by way of gun or taser, mediated by some kind of technology, it is body against
disadvantaged and vulnerable body. Floyd’s lack of resistance, coupled with his restrained
hands, only adds to the power differential evident in the scene. Yet despite all of this, Chauvin
continues to press his knee into Floyd. The lack of expression on his face only furthers the
message that this action is of no concern for Chauvin, he knows he is beyond Floyd’s and our
ability to stop or interfere and the support he receives from the other officers shows that his
assessment of the situation is correct. In fact, it is hard not to see this protected indifference as
part of the intended message when we consider the Minneapolis police department statement
released after Floyd’s death. In this statement, they emphasized Floyd’s “resistance” and
“medical duress” (Mannix, 2020). The fact that Floyd was restrained on his stomach (a tactic
generally only used in short bursts of time), that Chauvin put his knee on Floyd’s neck, and that
Floyd lay in that position for over 9 minutes is never mentioned in the press statement.
Constructing the situation in this way, with emphasis placed on Floyd’s actions and on his health
(things that the police would have no control over) indicates that other details were deemed
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unimportant or unnecessary in describing the event to the public. Furthermore, Chauvin’s brazen
awareness of the camera implies that he is aware that his actions will become known, but that
they will be deemed unimportant or insignificant to an understanding of the situation. That is, he
intends for his actions to be erased. But at the same time, this erasure will largely fail, for he is
being recorded. Therefore, despite officially being rendered invisible, Chauvin’s actions will be
visible to the community over which he has power. Just as lynchings in the South could become
hidden rituals, or what I have called “hooded lynchings”, while still socially functioning as
containing Black agency through “performance chaining”, so too did Chauvin’s act of killing
Floyd serve to chain the message of unreserved power over those in the community to which he
spoke. He could expect his message to both be invisible and visible at once, to those to whom he
was intending to speak.
But as Craig A. Hosterman (1978) says, violence has a way of simplifying messages.
And as DeLuca and Harold argued, the intended message of violence can become de-centered by
alternative readings of the text. I am arguing a similar process is at work regarding the method of
death for Floyd. Chauvin’s use of his knee and the barbarity of the act was intended to support
existing power relations regarding the police and the general public, especially when that public
is focused on a Black man. Through this reading, the people pleading with Chauvin to stop
would only enhance his message, as he now not only can ignore Floyd but also the crowd that
have taken Floyd’s side. It isn’t enough that Chauvin makes his message known, this message is
against the wishes of those who are also watching. And that he cannot be stopped then, nor can
he expect retribution from his department (the fact that his suspension and conviction were
contested shows that these outcomes were not forgone conclusions but matters of negotiation)
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makes clear the orientations to power that exist for everyone involved. Chauvin can do what he
wants, and there’s nothing that anyone can do about it.
The ways in which the crowd interacted with Chauvin on the video are of particular
interest here. There are a variety of strategies on display regarding how the crowd attempts to
change the outcome of the situation. This speaker then begins stating all the ways in which the
officers could handle the situation differently, pointing out that Floyd is unconscious, that he
can’t breathe, and that Chauvin appears to be enjoying his use of power. One crowd member
challenges the officers, antagonizing them for their callous treatment of Floyd and even begins
approaching the officers as if to stop them. Another speaker instead chooses to focus on the
“health” of Floyd, demanding that officers check for signs of life. Another speaker tells Floyd
directly “Give them a win...you can’t win, bro. You can’t win” (State of Minnesota v Derek
Michael Chauvin, 2020), attempting to save Floyd’s life by giving him knowledge about how to
conduct himself when interacting with the police. That Floyd dies despite the intervention of the
crowd only adds to the tragedy, and the crowd's chorus-like interjections contribute to the
affective moment.
But the simplification of message enacted by Chauvin’s violence had an excess. This
excess told a story in which there are those who are legally sanctioned to use violence and force
as they see fit with impunity. There is an “us” and a “them,” and this “them” can choose to end
your life whenever they want. This kind of reading resonated with the messages about police
abuse of power that had been made prevalent in national discourse by BLM and they were
readily cued when viewing the video. Through this lens, the barbarity of the use of Chauvin’s
knee communicated that police officers could execute you by any means they deemed necessary,
that no action was too depraved or inhumane for them to enact against anyone they deemed
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worthy of their attention. Put another way, the “hooded lynching” became legible, and as such
the precarity of the Black everyday was exposed. This suggests that hooding is not solely
constructed by location or executor of a lynching, but is also constructed through discourses and
knowledge surrounding those events. Schankweiler says that images “bear witness to multiple
realities and bring truths into being” (2018, p. 68), these truths being previously unseeable
horizons of intelligibility. And when that intelligibility dawns onto those frameworks for whom
everyday existence is dangerous, our previous framework becomes irreconcilable. For how could
be bring into synthesis the mundane everyday with the precarious? To see this precarity is to
learn what before was incommunicable. Or perhaps it is to see what has been deliberated
distorted through racist discourses and knowledge frameworks. This is what Benjamin points to
when he says, “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the state of exception in which we
live is not the exception but the rule” (Benjamin, 1968).
The next affective vector of the video is the audio. The audio connected with Floyd’s
death is dependent on which image you see, but I will be looking specifically at the audio from
the video taken by Frazier, with passing reference to audio transcripts from police body cam
footage for sections that are difficult to hear. In this video, I am identifying 3 elements of
affective accumulation, those being the sounds of Floyd, the silence of Chauvin, and the sounds
of those witnessing the event.
Over the course of the video, Floyd says over 20 times that he cannot breathe (BBC
News, 2020), he says the word “please” at least 9 times, calls for his mom 11 times, and shouts
out that he loves his mom and his kids (State of Minnesota v Derek Michael Chauvin, 2020). The
sounds of his pleading and shouting, the invocation of mothers and children and his love for
them all construct Floyd as a sympathetic victim. Like James Clark in 1926, Floyd becomes
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connected with elements of our own everyday. But it is the egregious nature of Chauvin’s
killing of Floyd that motivates action. By signaling those aspects of family that many of us share
we can identify Floyd as a human being, as someone with a life outside of the image that we are
seeing. He was a child at one point with a mother that he loved, he grew up, had kids, and wants
the best for them as in his final moments he calls out that he loves them. These are not the
actions of a “beast,” nor are they indicative of “medical duress.” They are indicative of a killing.
Floyd knew it, Chauvin and his department knew it, and the audience knew it.
Remember that there is a leap of faith built into the concept of witnessing. The witness,
and their testimony, must operate as both (recording) object and (experiencing) subject, and this
tension can only be overcome when we “believe” the witness, and therefore retroactively justify
their witnessing. Floyd as blood witness testifies to the violence done upon him, while the crowd
as eye-witness testify to the affective experience of the Event of his murder. As viewers, if we
are caught up in the transformative affective Event such that we become witnesses, where do we
sit within this system?
Only Floyd is blood witness here, and there is an experiential difference between video
viewer and gathered crowd, but I am arguing that affectively the difference between video
viewer and gathered crowd can become negligible. The eye-witness, in seeing the Event, does
not need to justify their experience beyond natural, passive awareness of experience. The video
viewer, however, is at least a step removed (perhaps more) from the Event in question. Yet for
all witnesses, there is the leap of faith regarding their believability. What justifies this leap? Here
it is the recognition of the degree to which the video has moved us and the recognition of
structural failure as its source. This is the same recognition had by the gathered crowd and in that
respect, there is no real difference between these viewers. As the gathered crowd expresses their
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horror, that expression of intensity accumulates, and transfers affect beyond the moment towards
other bodies interacting with the Event. At the moment that viewers recognize and align with the
crowd-as- witness, the viewers also become witnesses and as such also “know” the nature of
Chauvin’s actions upon Floyd.
Those gathered around Floyd also recognized the injustice of it all. In the transcript, one
voice, identified as speaker 13, shouts at all of the officers attending, castigating them for their
treatment of Floyd. He says,
Get him off the ground, bro. Get him off the ground...He ain't do any of that shit. He a
fucking bum bro, he enjoying that shit right now bro. You could have fucking put him in
the car by now, bro. He's not resisting arrest or nothing...body language is crazy...dudes
at the academy bro. you know that bogus right now bro. You know it's bogus. You can't
even look at me like a man because you...bro. He's not even resisting arrest right now bro.
(State of Minnesota v Derek Michael Chauvin, 2020)
Speaker 13 from the transcript, however, has a name. He is Donald Williams, who testified in
court during Chauvin’s trial. We can see from Williams’ voice that those present at the scene
could identify the plight that Floyd was in, and that he was suffering. Williams makes clear that
Chauvin is being read not as authoritative, but as sadistic, saying that Chauvin is “enjoying”
sitting on Floyd’s back and that his “body language” is betraying his indifferent exterior. Again,
speaking to the unfathomable length of time that Floyd was held in this position, Williams says
“you could have fucking put him in the car by now, bro”. Another voice on the body cam footage
demands that the officers check for a pulse, and Williams picks up this statement, repeating it
over and over again, to no avail.
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At 4:22 into the video (The Minneapolis Police Choke an Unarmed Handcuffed Black
Man to Death, 2020), there is a marked rise in intensity in the voices of those witnessing the
event as Floyd loses consciousness. Williams attempts to approach Chauvin, but is stopped by
other officers, but Williams exclaims that he’s not afraid of them. If violence and threats of
violence can be read as indicating the extent to which one is committed to something, Williams’
audible indicates that what he is seeing is so upsetting, so wrong, that he is committed to fighting
against agents of the state in order to stop it. More voices rise in concert with Williams in
demanding that Chauvin cease his restraint, but the only response they get is Chauvin
unholstering a can of mace as a threat for them to keep their distance.
Perhaps one of the hardest moments to experience audibly is the timbre of the voices in
the crowd as EMS arrives at the scene. At this point, it has been over 5 minutes since Floyd has
lost consciousness and Chauvin has still not gotten off of his neck. EMS technicians approach
Chauvin and attempt to inspect Floyd but struggle to do so because Chauvin will still not get off
of Floyd’s neck. The voices of those gathered still demanding for Chauvin to get off of Floyd
now take on a final sense of disbelief and desperation. They rise in volume and pitch, but their
words are no longer steady. They take on a wavering, lilting sound indicative of a tension in the
throat born out of the emotional intensity of the scene before them. The extent to which they are
affected has even reached their ability to speak. It is this aspect that perhaps affected me the most
as a viewer and listener, as that sound of desperation I can only remember hearing one other
time; the pleading of my mother when my father passed away. It is a sound of utter despair that
cannot fully be articulated, leaving it only to be fully comprehended on the nonlinguistic level of
affect (although at this point, mentioning affect feels like I am betraying the seriousness of the
moment).
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The ability for a viewer of the video to align with the crowd within the video as a witness
is significant in that it forms an affective connection between the experiencing eye-witness and
the third-party video viewer. To be affected by the video is to be aligned with the crowd to the
extent that the crowd expresses you as you express with the crowd. This identification greatly
impacts the degree to which we are horrified by Chauvin’s actions. Chauvin is not only defying
the protests of Floyd, he is not only defying the crowd, he is defying an affective community of
viewers who align themselves with Floyd and the crowd. This would mean that for each viewer
who is affected by the video to the extent that they “witness” the Event, there is one more
member of this affectively tied community, and therefore one more person that feels the utter
contempt of Chauvin’s actions.
The last affective element I would like to bring to attention is the presentation of the
abject through force. Julia Kristeva describes what is abject as “that which draws me toward the
place where meaning collapses” (Kristeva & Roudiez, 1982, p. 2), it is not an object except in
the sense that it is always opposite of what is “I”. It sits at the in-between of meaning and sense,
“It lies there, quite close, but it cannot be assimilated” (p. 1). Though it is not synonymous with
bodily fluids, we can experience the abject through such objects as we must confront that which
was us and is no longer us, thus challenging our clean separation of “self” and “other”. As that
which “cannot be assimilated,” an experience of abjection carries with it a certain sense of
affectivity relative to its intensity. An experience of abjection carries with it trauma, psychically
and perhaps physically as well, and as such is a thing typically avoided. If one accepts this view,
then my last point can be understood; there is an intensity connected to the experience of
violence that brings about abjection from another.
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When describing death as that which encroaches on everything, Kristeva describes it
opposite of something like excrement. With excrement, “I” am the one doing the expelling and
therefore can identify that excrement as the “not me” par excellence. But with death, “It is no
longer I who expel, ‘I’ is expelled” (p. 3-4). The line between self as subject and self as object,
between me and not me is blurred, bringing about the experience of abjection. But what is left
out here is the question of witnessing a body in its recognized state of abjection. It is perhaps not
a coincidence that at the 4:22 mark, when the intensity of the voices increases for the final time,
there is also a clear visual mark of abjection from Floyd. We can see drool falling from his
mouth onto the ground, and it appears that blood is trailing from his ear, pooling beneath him.
Spit and blood evoke the abject in us as we see ourselves come undone as united, living whole,
yet here that state of abjection is being forced on Floyd by Chauvin. We are seeing Floyd’s
blood, spit, the loss of his “subject-being” through the violence Chauvin enacts upon him. We
literally see Floyd’s “I” expelled. As this results in a rise in intensity, it is also marked as a node
for affective transmission and connection.
And what stands out to me here is that, after this moment, as Floyd has lost
consciousness, his body limp, spit and blood trailing from him, as he sits in the void between life
and unlife in our minds, Chauvin still does not get up. As forced abject experience, what is Floyd
at that moment? I cannot fully say, but I can say he is far beyond the level of threat. For whom
then does Chauvin continue to restrain him? Who or what is Chauvin attempting to protect in
continuing to restrict Floyd’s disused windpipe? It is this sustained restraint beyond life that
revels in abjection that appalls, that works affect upon those who witness. Donald Williams even
draws attention to this when he says of Chauvin “he enjoying that shit right now” (State of
Minnesota v Derek Michael Chauvin, 2020).
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And all of this, the sounds of Floyd and his words, the sounds of the crowd, the increase
in their volume and pitch, the tensions of their throats, all of this is only answered with silence.
Chauvin continues to be mute in the face of this moment. This refusal to respond again supports
the notion that Chauvin does not have to speak. He can choose to be silent because the situation
is entirely of his own making. And while this action directly says that Chauvin is the one in
power, it is the excess of this message that speaks even louder. Why is this happening? Why
won’t someone stop it? Why won’t the cops just get off of Floyd? Because there’s nothing
anyone can do about it. But the affective accumulation present in the other elements of the audio
force one to question why it is that no one can do anything about it? This seems so obviously
wrong, why can’t anyone stop it?
It is this assault on sense and logic that I see as paralleled in the Feminicidio Testimonio
as described by Michelle A. Holling (2014). Holling describes these Testimonios as presenting
stories or hyper-violence and sexual cruelty which assault the listener, who has been prepared in
such a way that the listener becomes a Listener-to-Witness, bringing with that term all the moral
obligation associated with it. The encounter with Floyd’s death seemed to have a similar effect.
Schankweiler argues a similar point in saying “Thus, the image testimony has taken on its own
life, somewhat independent from the witness as an individual person. The video, then, enables
the viewers to become co-witnesses, or what might be thought of as secondary eye witnesses”
(Schankweiler, 2018, p. 66). To be brought into the sphere of “witness” is to see what we did not
previously take responsibility for, to acknowledge what before was merely mundane. To elevate
to the level of attention what before we allowed to stay relegated to the background. The act of
communicating one’s witnessed account is to testify. But how does one testify what one cannot
see; what one has been cognitively prevented from seeing? I have argued that it is through the
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moment of the Event that our frameworks of sense are dislodged from their dogmatic, sacrosanct
positions, opening us up to new horizons of cognition. It is by way of affect that we then can see
alternative frameworks of sense, making what was previously hidden or illegible, visible. I have
attempted to argue that this is the process that was in play in the case of the video of George
Floyd’s killing by way of hooded lynching, and that, among many other factors, affect played a
key role in setting his killing apart from other examples of state execution. Michael Richardson
and Kerstein Schankweiler state the position well,
The strong affective relationship one develops with these videos when watching them
invests them with authenticity because the affective relationality is concrete, authentic
and real. In these image testimonies, witnessing and affecting correlate. In other words:
affect is at the core of witnessing (Richardson & Schankweiler 2019).
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Chapter 3
Introduction
So far, my argument has been that the act of witnessing has transformative power for the
viewer, and with that transformation comes new obligations. Though this witnessing is not
guaranteed in response to images of violence, there are ways in which the event can unfold in
just such a way that the dominant epistemological framework out of which we operate is
disrupted, becomes disjointed, or struggles to reconcile the event as we see it and the competing
mental scripts intended to make sense of what we are seeing. And while disjointed frameworks
present a problem for making sense of our experiences, affect moves and connects beyond the
level of sense-making. As such bodies can be brought into new relations even when
epistemological frameworks fail.
Following from this, we will consider the ways in which protestors at the Minneapolis
uprising utilized affective witnessing in threading their justificatory narrative. It will be helpful
to set the scene of the protest here before moving on. Floyd’s death was announced early on
Tuesday, May 26, 2020. The statement released by the Minneapolis Police Department called
Floyd’s death a medical issue, saying that he had died after being confronted by MPD officers
and resisting arrest. There was no mention of the restraint or the knee of Floyd’s neck. When
Darnella Frazier released her recording of the arrest several hours later, its depiction of the
events told a much different story. This caused the statement made by the MPD appear to have
been deliberately crafted to mislead people and coupled with the barbaric nature of Floyd’s
death, it seemed evident that the MPD had fully intended to cover-up the Floyd situation.
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Later that day, community members gathered at the corner where Floyd had been killed
and began to create a makeshift memorial for him. This gathering turned into a protest as
attendees began to chant “I can’t breathe” and held signs reading “Black Lives Matter” before
deciding to march from the memorial to the Third Precinct police department where Chauvin and
the other officers were mainly stationed, a distance of about two miles. After arriving at the
station the protesting continued until that evening, when many of the protestors went home.
Throughout the day the protests had been peaceful (9, 2021) and contained itself to using words,
signs, slogans, and chants to make their message known, but things changed when the sun went
down. Many of the peaceful protestors went back home, leaving only those who still felt they
had not been heard and were internally charged enough to stick around. These protestors began
destroying surrounding property, throwing rocks and bottles at police officers, and vandalizing
nearby buildings with graffiti. Other protestors tried to stop them, and this resulted in several
fights breaking out between protestors.
Over the course of the next three days, protestors burned buildings, looted stores and
private residences, destroyed property, and clashed with police. Perfectly encapsulating place in
protest (Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011) the most iconic of images born out of this span of time is
the burning of the third precinct police department, but images of the destruction of a Target
across the street from the precinct also captured national attention. On Saturday, May 30, the
National Guard were mobilized, at which point much the vast majority of violence and
destruction ceased (Caputo et al., 2020). A quick google search will reveal the extent to which
these images dominated news cycles around the country, while political leaders and activists
pleaded with the protesters to stop the destruction and return home. It would be fair for one to
assume that the protest became a source of contention within the national discourse of police
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accountability and reform, with the violence overshadowing the message of the protestors. But I
argue that this is not the case. While mainstream media may have made the destruction a focal
point in their coverage, the spread of the protests’ message would indicate that violence had not
overshadowed the goal. Within the United States, cities like Memphis and Seattle began their
own protests against the abuse of police power, with Floyd serving as the catalytic moment
uniting them. Some of these protests garnered their own kind of attention, for example the March
for Trans Lives, organized by drag performers West Dakota and Merrie Cherry, became one of
the largest peaceful protests in New York City History (Patil, 2020).
At the same time protests in solidarity with Floyd and the activists supporting him sprung
up all over the world. In total, protests have happened in more than sixty cities on all seven
continents9. And though each protest used their moment to bring attention to local issues, this
was done in conjunction with support for Floyd, rather than in competition. This would suggest
that the message of the protesters in Minneapolis was legible beyond the images of violence
generated by them.
From this I am arguing that part of the success of the Minneapolis protests lies in the fact
that they centered the affective relations, what I have called affective threads, in weaving their
justifications regarding the protests, even when images of the protest focused on violence and
destruction. In fact, I agree that the images of violence made the messages of the protestors more
compelling, as the violence showed how committed and serious the protestors were in their
demands for justice and change. Of course, the Minneapolis protest involved much more than
just violence and therefore we must be careful in how we attempt to make sense of the affective
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A great way to see the scope of protests worldwide, Wikipedia has created an interactive map that notes the location for every
protest that had over one hundred people attend. Website in references (“Template:George Floyd Protests Map - Wikipedia,”
2021)
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strategies of the protestors’ statements that I have collected and analyzed. For this project, I
relied on interviews conducted with protestors during the first 48-72 hours of the Minneapolis
protest. This allows me to see how protestors crafted the narrative of their actions while they are
performing them and simultaneously see how the protestors themselves viewed the violence they
were connected to. In doing so, I hope to acknowledge the violence as an occurrence while
decentering that violence as the source of meaning making for the movement.
I have divided this chapter into two broad sections; first is a history of the study of social
movement rhetoric, intended to help situate how we are to try and make sense of the messages of
the protest. The second section is a direct analysis of statements made by protestors during the
initial 24-36 hours following Floyd’s murder. This section is intended to make sense of the
different rhetorical strategies used by protestors as close to the inciting event as possible, while
also taking into account the concerns expressed by protestors and the ways in which many of
them differed from one another. From this we can gain a clearer picture of the ways in which
affect is woven into more traditional protest strategies, and the ways in which some strategies are
unique to specific groups.
Shiv Ganesh, writing in 2017, warned against the tendency for critics to be too reductive
in their understanding of social movements or protests. Arguing that it is easy to conceptualize
social movements and their discourses as being primarily technological, institutional, or
rhetorical, Ganesh nevertheless says that this reduction erases the specific “affective contours” of
a given event. To understand the discourse or the movement, we must not forget the “mobilizing
event” As he says,
[T]here is something deeply moving, unique, and singular, and thus dislocating about
particular events that have a power of their own and therefore need to be considered on

65

their own terms, and that technological, institutional, and rhetorical explanations for
contemporary mobilizations are incomplete without this sort of attention. (Ganesh, 2017,
p. 196)
The event itself has a power or transformative facet to it that cannot be reduced to technology or
rhetoric, but instead must be comprehended in the moment. It is to the event itself that we must
look if we wish to grasp these contingent “contours.” Ganesh goes on to say that “[w]e need to
work further towards understanding these events as potentially dislocating established
hegemonic discourses of society, politics, and economy” (Ganesh, 2017, p. 196). These are
exactly the kinds of claims that I have been making regarding Floyd and the Minneapolis
uprising. As such, I hope that this chapter, and this project as a whole, can contribute to
furthering our understanding of these events.
What moves a movement?
Historically, social movements have been understood through a sociological lens that
privileges organizational structures, and rhetoric largely borrowed from this understanding when
approaching the subject. In the early 1970s Herbert Simons, a highly respected scholar in the
field of social movement rhetoric, defined social movements as “an uninstitutionalized
collectivity that mobilizes for action to implement a program for the reconstitution of social
norms or values...from the bottom up” (Simons, 1970; Simons et al., 1984) and one looks for the
rhetoric (and therefore the action) of the movement to come from a leader to the members of the
movement. This construction of social movements treats them as if they are objects that exist in
the world that one can index in any number of literal ways. To study the rhetoric of these
movements becomes largely a matter of studying managerial rhetoric, as the text becomes the
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messages from the leaders to the members intended to organize, maintain, or guide the
movement itself towards its intended implementation of policy or program.
This means that the operative nature of social movement rhetoric requires the
identification of a leader or hierarchical structure, direct support for a specific policy or policies,
and a path being advocated for that brings about that policy or those policies. It can easily be
seen how sociology has influenced this view of social movement rhetoric with its emphasis on
existing human structure and organization, but this approach has drawbacks when it attempts to
consider social movements as they happen. What about those social movements that do not have
a traditional leadership structure? What about those movements that do not advocate for a
specific, identifiable policy? And what about movements that do not present a single path
forward for the advancement of that policy? The presuppositions necessary in maintaining this
sociological or Simonian view erase the existence of other forms of social organization and
advocacy. This is exactly what Temma Kaplan refers to when she describes women leaders in
the environmental advocacy movement as “carrying out an invisible revolution” (1996, p. 1).
The ways in which these leaders and their groups organize, protest, and communicate their
message is not easily translatable within the sociological framework, and as such had largely
been ignored or untouched.
Kevin Michael DeLuca in his book Image Politics (1999) recognizes Greenpeace and
Earth First! as two social movements that resist or are hostile to structural analysis. Greenpeace
does not follow a rigid leadership system, instead relying on individual acts of conscious that
bubble up into larger actions only post hoc recognized as collective action. That is, the “actions”
of the group are informed from the ground up, rather than top-down. In the case of Earth First!,
members deliberately reject any kind of structure beyond temporary group affiliations, with
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group founder Dave Foreman saying “We felt that if we took on the organization of the industrial
state, we would soon accept their anthropocentric paradigm, much as Audubon and the Sierra
Club already had” (Foreman, 1991, p. 21). How could one relying on the sociological framework
begin to recognize, let only analyze or critique, the rhetoric and actions taken by these two
groups or others like them?
Naturally, they could not. And it is this weakness that causes the sociological
understanding of social movements to falter when attempting to comprehend their rhetoric. More
to the point, the sociological approach subordinates the very element necessary for social
movement rhetoric to be of use in the first place, that is the non-phenomenal exchange of
meaning. Placing rhetoric as the center of one's social movement framework would require that
one first acknowledge that social movements are not entities, but rather meanings. In contrast to
the approaches previously described, Michael Calvin McGee understood social movements as “a
set of meanings and not phenomenon” and that it is the task of a rhetorical theory of movement
to be “a hermeneutical account of human consciousness, not an account of human organizational
behavior” (McGee, 1980, p. 234). This approach rejects the necessity of leaders, policy, or future
action when considering the rhetoric of social movements. Instead, it takes meaning as its
operative term and looks to investigate the ways in which humans interpret and makes sense of
those meanings, as well as the ways in which these meanings change over time because of
rhetoric. It is in the contested area of meaning and change that movements interact with, align,
and challenge the dominant narratives within a given society. Robert Cathcart, from his 1980
article on defining social movements by their rhetorical form, says,
A movement does not “move” in the objective world. It can only be interpreted through
bits and pieces of behavior and “created” by the symbolic form and meaning these verbal
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and non-verbal behaviors take on in relationship to already established symbolic forms
and meanings. A movement is perceived, created, and responded to symbolically as its
confrontational strategies are juxtaposed with the symbolic forms and contents of the
established and legitimized collectives with which it interacts. (Cathcart, 1980, p. 268)
This view is more inclusive in its understanding of movement and rhetoric in that the
defining features of phenomena (I.e. extension, duration, cohesion, etc.) inform but do not limit
the investigation. What I mean here is that, for Simons, a movement is formed and indexed
through its leadership. And while he does acknowledge bottom-up elements of social
movements, it is the leadership that speaks for the movement and makes known its intentions.
This would mean that space and time can fundamentally separate social movements. Two social
movements with the same stated goals but operating with different leaders and different paths of
achievement would not be linked together in Simons’ view, as that which makes a movement
would be different between the two of them. But as DeLuca and Kaplan have pointed out, social
movements are more complex and nuanced than this, and separating movements simply because
they organize themselves in a way that traditional sociology does not recognize reinforces
entrenched ideas about who is authorized to speak and how that speaking is made legitimate.
For Cathcart, social movements are “a kind of conflict” that are best understood by their
use of “confrontation” (Cathcart, 1978, p. 235) as a defining feature, and that they are not
“objective phenomenon but symbolic transformations of reality effected by rhetorical forms and
languaging strategies” (1983, p. 70). However, Cathcart struggled to fully separate his
understanding of social movement from the objectivist or phenomenalist view, still seeing them
in part as existing “in space and over time” and as having (needing?) “...membership, leadership,
and organization” (1980, p. 268). McGee on the other hand, fully committed to the
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“movement=meaning” position, described social movements as “changes in the meanings of the
world, redefinitions of reality, with such realities always being constructed through the filter of
rhetoric” (McGee, 1975) and claimed that the critic could trace social movements in human
consciousness by looking for changes in the ideographic structure social systems (1980). This
approach inspired or influenced more thinkers and theorists, including Melucci (1985), Laclau
and Moffe (1985), and DeLuca (1999) and contributed to a robust system of concepts and
theories.
For example, Laclau and Moffe present a system in which social movements arise
because of the antagonisms within hegemonic discourses which oppress specific groups of
people. These groups then articulate these antagonisms, revealing the limits of hegemony and in
doing so circumscribing that hegemony within a realm of intelligibility. But not every group of
people is oppressed in immediately similar ways, and as such it becomes the duty of movements
to expand the “chains of equivalencies” that can unite otherwise differently oppressed groups
(1985). Continuing, DeLuca takes this view but supplements it and brings it fully into the realm
of rhetoric. For Laclau and Moffe, articulation involves making known and linking “elements.”
These elements exist before being articulated as “things that are” but take on a kind of noumenal
quality in that they are “empty signifiers.” But we can only hold the concept “empty signifer” as
general reference, not discreet meaning, for the moment we cognize any signifer, it is no longer
empty. Much like incredibly large numbers, there is point at which we no longer “know” a
concept, despite our ability to reference or utilize it. And it is this aspect that DeLuca seizes on,
for he rejects the notion that elements as empty signifers are really what link together the chains
of equivalencies. Instead, he substitutes McGee’s ideographs for elements, as the ideograph is
always already linked within a living world and responsive to the shifts and changes in the
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relations of use of that world. Under this view, the critic still looks for those limits of hegemony
as articulated by social movements, but the meanings and linkages of these articulations are
matters of rhetoric.
As time has passed, these theories and concepts have changed and expanded to
accommodate shifts in social organization. With the proliferation of television, social movement
theorists attempted to make sense of the new ways in which messages could be transmitted,
arguing that this shift in medium constituted a shift in the nature of protest messaging entirely
(DeLuca & Peeples, 2002; Delicath & DeLuca, 2003). But if the television signaled a shift in
protest rhetoric, the internet signaled an entire transformation. Now, disparate individuals and
groups from all over the world can connect and interact with each other, forming alliances and
coalitions in ways that were previously inconceivable. This newfound interconnectedness has
been of interest to some scholars for the fluidity it imparts onto concepts like social movements,
and they have turned to affect theory to help make sense of this change (Ganesh & Stohl 2013;
Gantt-Shafer et al., 2019; Pullen & Franklin 2020). As already stated, affect theory concerns
itself with embodied experience and how connections between bodies shift and change. This is
particularly interesting to scholars of social movements because it opens up new pathways for
investigating how participants in movements become compelled to act. Christopher Pullen and
Ieuan Franklin (2020) utilized affect and emotion to see how bodies serve as a method of
alignment for youths situated at the intersection of queerness and migratory status. In a similar
vein to my project, they also contend that affect is accumulated through the act of witnessing,
and in the process opening up the potential for transformation. As a tool, affect gives the critic
another avenue by which they can trace “the movement of the social” (McGee, 1980).
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With affect’s inherent embodied and relational standing its use seems almost a natural fit
for social movement’s study. But I will need to be explicit about how we are investigating affect
before we begin, as the field is diverse in how it applies the concept. In their chapter on
videography as method, Knoblauch et al. (2019) attempt to lay out an approach to studying the
social exchange of affect, and they settle on two relevant vectors of investigation10. The first is
ethnographic experience (“being there”) and the second is close analysis of recorded footage.
This approach both has precedent and is echoed in later research (Knoblauch, 2011; Tuma,
Schnettler, & Knoblauch, 2013; Lünenborg & Maier, 2019) and is founded on the idea that either
vector on its own runs the risk of flattening or misrepresenting affective data. By viewing
recorded (and therefore objective) experience the researcher can confer and confirm with others
what is informed by their subjective, temporally limited experience of the event. I have no issue
with this approach, but as such I will need to defend why I have proceeded with an affective
investigation that forgoes one of these elements (personal experience).
I only have two defenses in response to this project lying outside of the expected norm
regarding movement affective study; the first a matter of accessibility, the second a matter of
theory. As it stands, I was not there when George Floyd was killed. Nor was I there when the
Minneapolis uprising happened. Practically speaking, personal experience as a method is
unavailable to me. That being said, I am taking the position here that that is not a defeater for the
project which leads into the matter of theory. As affect cannot be exhaustively contained in
words, personal experience is meant to offer something of a repository of affective exchange
from which the critic can draw from. This is supported both as an embodied positioning of the
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This statement is not meant to be totalizing or reductive. Their chapter is quite thorough in how they intend to approach their
study of affect, and an astute reader may pick out other, perhaps more relevant, vectors or loci of investigative orientation. What I
mean here is only that there are two vectors that I wish to focus on.
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critic (Middleton et al., 2017) and as rhetorical topoi by way of place (Endres & Senda-Cook,
2011). But I am contending that witnessing the video can serve the same function (though not
identically) as experience. And I hold this position here for several reasons. As I have already
argued, though watching the video is not the same thing as witnessing the event, it is through the
movement and intensity of affect that the event can rise to the level of demanding witnessing in a
viewing audience. But there is more; Elizabeth Brunner (2017) looks at the way in which affect
can unite groups of people but does so through a lens informed by DeLuca and Peeples public
screens (2002) and Ewalt et al.’s (2013) networked public screens. She calls this intersection
wild public screens and argues that this juncture-as-theory allows for the critic to take both
modern media use and the ephemerality of movements seriously. But this ephemerality means
that the critic is never quite studying meaning-as-objects but meaning-as-traces. These traces
indicate “momentary connections” (Brunner, 2017, p. 671) marked by “presence and absence”
that “change over time” (Derrida, 1988). That is, to begin to investigate affect is to alwaysalready accept the unstable nature of embodiment. Requiring personal experience as supplement
for recorded moment is to privilege presence over absence, fundamentally undermining the
power of the witness of/to the witness.
In addition, to overlook the event of Floyd’s murder and the protest due to lack of
presence would be to leave unexamined a necessary element of Black social movements entirely,
that is “critical Black memory”. Ore (2019), when describing Black memory in relation to the
circulation of lynching images within Black communities describes it as “repository of black
experiential knowledge used to combat the silencing and historical forgetting of not just
lynching, but also lynching’s relationship to the state” (2019, p. 79). While Ore’s focus is
lynching, what I want to draw your attention to here is the idea that there exists a “repository of
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black experiential knowledge” that Black people draw from when making sense of the world.
Michael Hanchard (2008) says Black memory serves to “[arrange] seemingly disparate signs and
symbols into a coherent narrative” (p. 48) that situates Black peoples’ place in a hostile world as
a technology of survival. This collective memory is dialectically constituted by/through
individuals (a situation Hanchard investigates and complicates in his work) and operates
functionally, giving it an ephemeral, non-objective existence which resists traditional
investigation, as it challenges and eludes traditional objective thinking, especially regarding
identity and experience. Cedric Robinson, when describing the Black Radical Tradition, called it
“an accumulation of the collective intelligence gained and leveraged by successive generations
who struggled against and resisted enslavement, segregation, and exploitation” (Robinson,
2000), but given this definition, it is not difficult to see the ways in which this understanding of
the Black Radical Tradition and the utilization of Black memory overlap in purpose, if not in
name.
Furthermore, drawing connections between Black memory and social movements is to
draw attention to a weakness inherent to the understanding of social movements introduced by
McGee and those who draw from him. Dana Cloud, in her article The Null Persona: Race and
the Rhetoric of Silence in the Uprising of ’34 (1999) considers the ways in which consciousness
and discourse can be at odds with each other in terms of social action and what text is available
to the critic. The work is far reaching in its scope, but what is of interest for me here is her
critique of what I have been presenting so far as the primary conceptual organization of social
movements. Cloud argues that, while productive, an understanding of social movements as
meaning ignores the real, material conditions that make up the rest of a person’s life. Using the
cotton mill workers strike of 1934 as an object of study, Cloud investigates the ways in which
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certain workers, specifically Black workers, articulate their position within the social order that
made up the warring classes of strikers and owners. Of note for Cloud is the ways in which
looking only at discourse would warp the critic’s understanding of the actual position of the
Black workers and their families. It is only by understanding constraints that lie beyond the
direct discourse that we can understand the ways language has been adopted to allow Black
communities to survive. Once we know how we should be interpreting the language of these
Black workers and their communities, a different picture comes into focus that puts the Black
worker in solidarity with the striking white worker, but at odds in stating this position because of
the threat of violence looming when this commitment would be made.
Considering the material conditions of speakers and the ways these conditions can
condition silence can give us a more holistic understanding of the political actor or protestor. By
acknowledging that these conditions can act as restraints on the voices of certain speakers,
leaving them in a precarious position that can only be navigated through controlled and strategic
use of voice, critics can begin to not only better understand meanings, but also better critique the
“conduits of repressive economic and state power” (Cloud, 1999, p. 201) that otherwise would
be hidden behind the silences and pauses of the null persona. These silences and pauses (as well
as other language games of survival) exemplify a careful use of voice that articulates through
silence constraints that reach beyond the communicative and to the level of politics, coercion,
and ultimately violence. This is why Cloud says “[an] approach that regards movements as
primarily or exclusively discursive phenomena cannot account for this material, coercive
context” (Cloud, 1999, p. 201). Black critical memory as an additive conceptual tool can help us
to keep the material conditions of Black communities in focus while we investigate the battles
and shifts over meaning that activists and protestors are engaged in.
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If one wants to utilize Black memory as a rhetorical tool, where does one locate the
archive? The ephemerality of Black memory, coupled with its at best disregard and at worst
deliberate erasure against state memory, makes clearly defining or locating the archive difficult
in a certain sense. But still, there are ways to trace the “parameters” as Michael Hanchard says.
For Hanchard (2008) Black memory should be considered “as the phenomena of a collectivity
rather than the practice of an isolated and disparate array of individuals” (p. 47), and as such its
parameters can be mapped through an understanding of themes rather than mapping personal
experiences. Hanchard identifies a few of these themes as “[r]acism, slavery, reparations,
nationalism and anticolonial struggle, and migration” while also recognizing that this list is
neither complete nor exclusive to Black memory. We can see how these themes intertwine with
contingent aspects of Black life in the Unites States and more universal aspects of the existence
of oppressed peoples. But we should also acknowledge that this collectivity is nothing without
the individuals for whom it is useful. Therefore, Hanchard is hesitant to draw hard lines between
individual and collective memory in relation to Black ontology.
But while this can trace the parameters, it does not specifically give us an archive.
However, I think borrowing from performance studies can be of use here in settling on a method
for critically grasping Black memory. An archive is not simply a collection of information, rather
it refers to a historically robust conceptual term. According to Diana Taylor (2003) the archive is
physical material, it is “texts, documents, buildings, [and] bones” (p. 19) that persist through
time and do not change. Viewed this way, locating the archive of Black memory would be nearly
impossible as much of its implemented history happened during a time when Black people were
not legally allowed to read or write. To expect an archive of Black memory under this view
would be to reject its existence outright. But this is exactly the situation that Taylor wants to
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rectify. Against the rigidity of the archive, she offers the repertoire as embodied collective
memory. As she describes it, the repertoire “enacts embodied memory: performances, gestures,
orality, movement, dance, singing” along with other “acts usually thought of as ephemeral,
nonreproducible knowledge” (p. 20). If we can group these enacted embodied memories as
“cultural”, then it is through the socializing process of enculturation that the repertoire is passed
down, ever changing in relation to the contingent demands of the people for whom it is useful.
And here is how we can intersect between Hanchard and Taylor; Black memory can be
understood as a racial repertoire of survival that signals to the critic in its thematic expressions.
For the critic who is enculturated to the repertoire, Black memory is invoked in those embodied
enactments of Black survival in a racist world. But for the critic who is not a part of the group,
they can look for the themes of survival as outlined by Hanchard as signs indicative of Black
memory at work. Naturally this method would not be full proof, but hermeneutically it provides
us a way of understanding Hanchard’s view of Black memory as helping “...tell a story that
arranges seemingly disparate signs and symbols into a coherent narrative, thus giving the
ensemble of signs and symbols a meaning larger than their isolated representations” (Hanchard,
2008, p. 48).
As practical, embodied collective knowledge, Black memory is only ever present in the
mode of exchange, in relations. We cannot hope to capture it in a bottle, nor can we hope to
understand it in the definition of a textbook. Rather we must look to those who are speaking in
harmony with Black memory regarding their experiences with and against oppressive regimes, to
ways of living and surviving within oppressive structures, if we ever hope to hear the music of
memory at play. But, much like hooded lynching, we must have ears to hear. And I say harmony
here explicitly, because one is not “speaking” Black memory, but speaking together “with”
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Black memory, as it always connects one to a larger well of knowledge beyond any one
individual. The lyrics, the words, can be exactly the same, and yet melody and harmony do not
rupture each other, but entwine together towards an emergent whole, a dialectic symbiosis. As
such, even acknowledging my lack of physical presence, there is still investigative work to be
done regarding the recorded images surrounding the Minneapolis uprising and the murder of
Floyd.
The Fire Next Time
Cornell West called Floyd’s murder a “public lynching” (Muir, 2020), opinion writer for
USA Today Michael Deegan-McCree called Floyd’s (and Arbery’s) killing “modern-day
lynchings” (Deegan-McCree, 2020). George’s brother, Philonise Floyd, when speaking before
The House of Representatives Judiciary Committee made the same claim, saying “They lynched
my brother. That was a modern-day lynching in broad daylight” (Morgan, 2020), which was then
published by Reuters, an international news agency. It is fair to say that eventually connecting
Floyd’s murder with the long history of racial terrorism that is lynching became a matter of
mainstream discourse, which in turn means that Floyd’s death signaled a change in the national
script of Black death; that is, they viewed it at all, and then additionally recognized it as unjust11.
But this connection and this discourse was not pulled out of the Aether, rather it was the
culmination of discourses happening “on the street” during and after the Minneapolis protest.
That the protests could be recognized as violent and yet have aspects of its discourse picked up
As Charles E. Morris III rightfully pointed out to me, this change can’t be understood as universal, as there were many people
who were already aware of lynching’s history, and others that rejected the construction of lynching outright. For these people,
there was no change. And I agree, but what I am trying to show is the “level” of discourse that invoking lynching became
acceptable at. On the street, we can identify a victim of police brutality as a lynching without much protest. But as one begins to
speak in halls of power, on national television, or national radio, words like “lynching” are so charged that they generally are
only used to refer to historic events rather than describe current ones. Freddie Gray’s death was a lynching, but this wasn’t stated
at the capital nor was it carried on national airwaves. But in the case of Floyd, this word was used, and used often. The fact that it
became a descriptor, even a contested one, indicates that there had been a shift somewhere in how Floyd’s death was understood.
11
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and repeated is something worth investigating. In this section I will attempt to delineate the
differences between discourses within social movements before then looking closely at
statements made by protestors in the act of protesting to see the strategies utilized by the
protestors to construct a view of themselves as justified.
Bennett & Segerberg (2012) define two nodes of orientation for protests or political
action, those being collective action and connective action. Collective action follows a standard
organizational script, where groups under a unified banner act according to the wishes of an
agreed upon authority within certain parameters regarding that action. This understanding of
action fits nicely within the sociological framework of movements and as such is effective at
describing the actions of definitive groups. Connective action is a bit different in that traditional
expectations of hierarchy or organization are upended, replaced with what Ganesh and Stohl call
a “decentralized digital [network]” (2013, p. 430) that takes on the form of an organization.
Protests that operate under this understanding include members who are highly connected to
digital media, and are linked through large, impersonal digital networks. In a previous work
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2011), they argue that a core aspect of digitally networked action
involved giving personal meaning to large, ambiguous collective goals, which seems to map unto
an understanding of critical Black memory that looks to make sense of events that otherwise
would be seen as disparate as fundamentally connected through sympathetic logics. What this
means for us here is that critical Black memory can be seen as a kind of network that contributes
to connective action. If this is the case, then the fact that leaders were reading Floyd’s murder as
a lynching is indicative of a lower-level discourse that identified Floyd’s murder as lynching.
This vernacular would have made sense of Floyd’s death through a lens that both saw Floyd’s
death as a unique event and as fitting within a larger context of overlooked hooded lynchings.
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One aim in this section is to show that this discourse was invoked during the protests. Another
aim is to look at the way in which those who lack access or knowledge of critical Black memory
were still affected by this discourse, in part because of the way the discourse connected itself to
the affective threads embedded in the act of witnessing Floyd’s murder.
In attempting to trace the street-level discourse, there will be more attention paid to those
aspects that would be defined as connective, which involves people and actors who are not
immediately recognizable as or who do not stand in for the entire movement. But there were
actions taken on the collective level that worked toward framing responses to the Floyd video
and the protest as connected. Alicia Garza, recognized as one of the originators of Black Lives
Matter said, “It’s a familiar pattern: to call for peace and calm but direct it in the wrong
places...Why are we having this conversation about protest and property when a man’s life was
extinguished before our eyes?” (Remnick, 2020). Meanwhile, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez noted
“If you’re calling for an end to unrest, but not calling out police brutality, not calling for health
care as a human right, not calling for an end to housing discrimination, all you’re asking for is
the continuation of quiet oppression”12, (Remnick, 2020). In both of these statements there is an
acknowledgement that the uprising and the structural injustice of the Minneapolis police
department’s handling of Floyd and the larger Black community are linked in complicated and
varied ways. That is, rather than arguing that the violence and destruction of the protests
undermined the message of the protestors, Garza and Ocasio-Cortez say that focusing solely on
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The quote by AOC can be traced to a tweeted video posted on May 30 th, 2020. This places it within the window of time that
the Minneapolis protests were happening, and slightly after the initial days of protesting, which tracks with my understanding of
her statement as falling with the organizational realm of “collective action”. The quote by Alicia Garza, however, is more
difficult to track. I can confirm that the first publication of this quote happened on May 31 st, in an article published by The New
Yorker, and that this was a statement given to The New Yorker by Garza, but the exact day that she gave it is not known. This
leaves Garza’s statement a bit ambiguous regarding when, and therefore to whom, it was intended. But the fact that she is seen as
a political leader, I feel, allows me to group her statement in the same realm as AOC’s as collective action.
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the violence and destruction is to side with the oppressor. Garza specifically cites Floyd’s death
in connection with the uprising, and in that sense to side with the oppressor is to side with
Chauvin. Garza’s connecting Floyd to the uprising also links that affective accumulation of
Floyd with that of the uprising, constructing a situation in which the sympathy that many had for
Floyd could be transferred to the protestors when one is looking at the scenes of violence that
they caused.
The collective/connective can function well as a logic or a lens, but I do not wish to
imply a clean separation between the two objectively, as that risks flattening the situation or
erasing the contributions of those who might sit somewhere between. Consider Samantha PreeGonzalez, a resident of Minneapolis, woman of color, and activist coordinator operating during
the time of the protests. She oversaw the distribution of food, medical supplies and personnel,
and information to people and groups all over the city. Does she represent a hierarchical
collective, or street-level connective? I am not in a position to make the definitive call, but it at
least appears that she may sit as a kind of in-between regarding these logics. Her positioning will
serve as a necessary linkage between the shift from collective focus to connective focus. PreeGonzalez says,
We know it because we’ve been feeling it, white folks had what, three days of being
uncomfortable? This is like my regular everyday thing that’s why I’m calm, cool, and
collected...the more you choose to be indignant, and the more you choose to let your ego
be in the way, the more the same knee that was on George’s neck is gonna be on your
neck, like it’s some color purple shit.” (Behind the Scenes at the Minneapolis Protests,
2020)
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Pree-Gonzalez's statement here illustrates several important factors regarding how protestors
constructed their struggle to those on the “outside”. Saying “we’ve been feeling it” explicitly
draws attention to the felt (affective) character of Floyd’s murder. But she then puts a twist on
this response, comparing the three days of “being uncomfortable” felt by “white folks” with the
“regular everyday” of Black people. Black people live in a state of “uncomfortablility,” what
Benjamin calls “the state of exception” as the rule, and what I refer to as the precarity of the
everyday, and this crisis-as-normal makes a critical Black memory a necessary tool for survival.
By drawing attention to this precarity, Pree-Gonzalez connects the affective thread of Floyd’s
murder not as an extraordinary event, but as an everyday occurrence, an opening up of the
horizon of Black memory that sits just beyond dominant knowing or remembering.
This affective connection is again invoked when she draws attention to Chauvin’s “knee
that was on George’s neck.” This statement operates in two ways, first it ties itself with the
experience of seeing Floyd’s murder happen “with bare hands” as I have argued earlier. But
second, it does this in a way that helps listeners connect this specific incident with a larger
history of Black death by saying that the knee that was on George’s neck “is gonna be on your
neck.” The actions taken by Chauvin and the subsequent response by the Minneapolis police
department were not the rogue actions of a few bad apples, they were a rehearsed and acceptable
response whose message had become uncontrolled. Pree-Gonzalez, by weaving the thread of the
knee into her own calls for justice, connects the larger systemic injustice to the specific injustice
that motivated action in the first place while also evoking the experience of witnessing Floyd’s
death.
And this may be of use in helping to focus the affective response into policy. In Jonas
Bens’ chapter on Affective Images and the Political Trial (2018) he presents us with a situation
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in which a trial for a war criminal is being held. Representatives for NGOs all over the world are
there and are particularly moved when graphic video and images are shown of dead children and
burning houses, with some saying it was the most powerful aspect of the trial. Yet, when victims
of these events were interviewed, they did not express any real interest in the video or the
images. One young man said he found aspects of the prosecution not satisfactory, with Bens
quoting him in saying “All one would have been able to see were burning huts and dead children.
‘You could not see Dominic Ongwen (the person on trial) on this video’, nor any LRA rebels for
that matter” (p. 32). The very presentation that moved the NGO representatives was the very
information that the victims of the crime felt to be a distraction.
Bens argues that the reason for this “lies in the affective rather than the emotional register
of the images that were performed” (p. 38). For Bens, affect moves and concentrates before the
level of conscious awareness, and as such cannot be grasped within our mental categories of
emotion. Emotion then becomes a kind of production of affect after it has been grasped by
consciousness. Through repeated exposure, affect can go through a sedimentation process
whereby our sense of it changes and becomes entangled in our conscious, intentional mind. In
this way, emotional responses are still within the realm of conscious thought and therefore can fit
within our intentional world of control. Affect lies beyond this world and beyond our control,
ever coaxing our responses but always outside of our grasp to fully comprehend. So when the
NGO representatives were confronted with the images, they were taken in by the intensity of
their affective experience, but the victims had moved beyond the level of affect to the level of
emotion, so while the images were still shocking, the victims were more concerned with how
they fit into the larger structure of the prosecution's case.
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To borrow Bens’ terms, Pree-Gonzalez is attempting to build a bridge between the
affective experience of Floyd’s murder and the emotional experience of policy change. In
drawing on Black memory, Pree-Gonzalez is attempting to make known the situation as it really
is for Black communities to people who would have been unaware of their situation. This being
unaware would be evidenced by the fact that their response to Floyd’s murder was affective
rather than emotional13. Pree-Gonzalez wants this affective accumulation to translate into
material change and offers her analysis as a way of shifting viewers from being affective
witnesses to being political agents.
Pree-Gonzalez's statement, when taken in conjunction with the statements of Garza and
Ocasio-Cortez, reveal a pattern of construction regarding how we should understand Floyd’s
treatment and how we should understand the actions of the protestors in Minneapolis. However, I
want to suggest that these statements were partly born out of discourses happening on the street
level; that the protestors in Minneapolis had already spoken. By looking at how the protestors
described themselves and their reasons for action, we can begin to see what some of these
connective discourses looked like and begin to see how these discourses utilized the affective
threads of Floyd’s killing to bind together their justifications as well as their calls to action.
I will primarily be pulling from two sources regarding the protestors. Those would be a
mini documentary by Andrew Callaghan, and an investigative piece published by VICE. The
reasons for these choices are multiple, though the most important reason has to do with who is
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To be clear, I am not claiming that affect and emotion should in fact be separated. Nor am I claiming that they are
interchangeable. In fact, I would hope that that decision is ultimately up to the reader to decide and that this project would only
give them tools for figuring out their answer. However, I still utilized Bens’ categorization for two reasons, first for clarity; in
drawing the distinctions that he does it becomes much easier for me to describe what I see as happening and did not want that
vocabulary to be left out. And two, because ultimately affect needs utility, and if I accept its embodied standing, then affect
would by necessity be fraught with nonduality. As such I do not see an issue in utilizing both “affect vs emotion” and “affect as
emotion” language, provided that I am clear about which form I am using at any given time.
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given voice to speak. In coverage of the uprising published by major news networks, experts and
political pundits are allowed to speak, with their voices being cast over images of burning
buildings or people stealing from stores or other scenes of violence. There are other instances
where people thought to be Black leaders were given the chance to “speak” to the protestors,
while in other cases political figures were given the chance to offer their assessment of the
situation and suggest possible means of action for the government on a large scale. But
Callaghan and VICE differ from this coverage in that they traveled directly to the streets of
Minneapolis and asked protestors in person about their motivations, then allowed them time to
explain their own intended meaning.
The protestors, when allowed to speak, construct a different account of their actions than
what certain mainstream media outlets would tell. For instance, many of the protestors
acknowledge the violence and destruction, but explain that part of the protest in different ways.
For instance, one unnamed protestor (0:10)14 says to Callaghan
This is how people are actually feeling...is this the way to go about it? No! But is
everyone perfect? No. What I’m trying to say is, everyone feel like that. Everybody feel
like that. That’s all I got to say. (Minneapolis Protest, 2020)
Important to note here that the protestor is standing in front of and referring directly to a burning
building. This protestor directly invokes the feeling of watching Floyd’s killing in justifying the
actions of the protestors; by saying this is how people “actually feeling,” and “everybody feel

In Callaghan’s coverage of the protest, he does not ask for any identifying information from his speakers. Instead, he asks
them open-ended questions about their presence at the protest and then lets them speak for however long they wish. This allows
his interviews to be quite honest in their portrayal of their subjects, but it creates a problem regarding how to reference which
protestor is speaking when I quote them in text. To help differentiate between protestors I have indicated the timestamp at which
they speak, both to clearly mark different speakers and to allow anyone reading to quickly jump to any quote given here should
they wish to watch the video or see the statements for themselves.
14 6
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like that,” the protestor brings attention to the fact that we are not separate from our bodies, nor
are our emotions separate from us as actionable. We do what we feel. What’s more, he does not
attempt to absolve the destructive actions of the protestors from moral condemnation, admitting
that this isn’t “the way to go about it.” But in doing so, he draws attention to the fact that these
protestors exist in such a situation that these kinds of actions are felt to be required. And by
concluding with “That’s all I got to say,” he perhaps embodies the meaning of his statement, that
in fact words are not necessary or will fail to communicate the message of the protest as well as
the burning building will.
Another protestor, Tune Okello, when asked about the violence happening that night said
this, “If we didn’t react like we did, what do you think would have happened, you know as a
result? Nothing really would be done unless we out here stepping” (Behind the Scenes at the
Minneapolis Protests, 2020). And the sentiment he is expressing, that nothing would be done, is
echoed by many of the protestors interviewed. For instance, an unnamed protestor interviewed
for VICE said, when asked about the intention of the protest said, “Everything on fire.” The idea
that allowing the system to run its course will result in justice has been utterly rejected, calling
instead for the destruction of the whole thing. As a matter of Black survival, we see an
interesting engagement with Black memory on display here. There is a recognition of the historic
lack of attention paid to Black bodies and Black communities, but while normally this would be
circumvented through establishing community alternatives, here the protestor utilizes this
knowledge to justify calling for the destruction of the system itself.
In a moment of energetic outburst, Okello along with another protestor both begin
speaking at the same time, which indicates the high affectivity and emotion of the moment, with
the unnamed protestor saying, “It’s real, it’s painful,” while Okello says “I want them to
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understand the next time something like this happens you don’t rest. Don’t rest” (Behind the
Scenes at the Minneapolis Protests, 2020). Here we see how these protestors are wrestling with
the dual demands of community outrage and civic responsibility, but within a racially oppressive
context. On the one hand, there is an expression of genuine pain, “it’s real, it’s painful” but
unlike a view that would see this issue as an isolated tragedy, these protestors have to also come
to terms with the fact that this injustice is only another in a long line of systemic injustice. The
idea that this is just an isolated incident executed by a few bad apples is unconvincing in the face
of an audience who must operate with a repertoire that organizes disparate examples of Black
death into an overarching narrative of white supremacy. Again, we see how Black memory is at
work in how these protestors survive in and make sense of the world in which they live.
Okello’s recognition that “nothing really would be done” and “next time...don’t rest”
reveals to us that his understanding of Floyd’s murder is informed both by the past and a
recognition that this event will happen again. He is arguing that historically the systems in place
to control police behavior have failed, contributing to a culture of policing wherein violence
done against Black people is justified or ignored. In turn, more violence is done against Black
people which re-starts the whole process again. This cycle creates a sense of hopelessness in
those whom it victimizes, and that hopelessness is evident in these protestors' statements. The
notion of “everything on fire” is a direct recognition of the failures of the system to protect those
who are most vulnerable to abuse. After decades of oppression, exploitation, and neglect, to play
by the rules is to accept defeat before you have even started. It is no longer about dialogue but
about recognition and acknowledgement. “Everything on fire” is a statement that cannot be
ignored. And this feeling is repeated by other protestors as well; protestor (2:07), when asked
about the protest and the destruction said, “Dude, it’s fucking necessary.” He qualified with, “It
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sucks to see our city burning man but, they finally fucking listening to us” (Minneapolis Protest,
2020). Here are two more excerpts from protestors across the two videos; the first is by protestor
(0:49) who says, “We will be heard.” And then when asked about those who were criticizing the
burning of buildings said this
Because they don’t know. They privileged, they ain’t feeling this. This is temporary,
okay? This is temporary shit. This is our future we standing up for, we making history
right now. Our ancestors live through us. They live through us. And we gonna cause a
scene. We will be heard, y’all don’t wanna listen? You gone feel us. (Minneapolis
Protest, 2020)
Another protestor, Chantaveia Burnett, said
We gotta get violent, we gotta get violent you know? If that’s what makes them scared, if
that’s what makes, you know, things change. Peacefulness will only get you so
far...There’s a peaceful side and a violent side. Everyone’s got something to say. If they
hurt us, I’m gonna do something back, I’m not gonna just take it. (Behind the Scenes at
the Minneapolis Protests, 2020)
Taken together, these statements address both concerns regarding the erasure of Black struggle
as well as the demand for civic engagement, and all through a historic lens. Sometimes one has
to “get violent” when all other avenues for social change have been exhausted. Here violence is
not being used for its own sake, nor is it being used to try and suppress the ability for others to
speak and move freely. This is in contrast to a use of violence intended to prevent or silence
others from speaking. Instead, violence is being used to be allowed to speak at all, because
“everyone’s got something to say” and “we will be heard”.
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By invoking “ancestors”, protestor (0:49) situates his activism within a larger history of
systemic oppression and state violence. These protests are not happening simply because of what
was done to Floyd, but because what was done to Floyd has been done repeatedly, with Floyd
simply being the latest cast member of the drama. In stating that these ancestors “live through
us,” protestor (0:49) calls direct attention to the embodied performativity of Black memory. The
actions of the protestors are not being done out a temporally local sense of outrage, but rather are
situated within a horizontal memory of state oppression. This horizontal memory is what sees
Floyd as being co-current with other instances of Black death, and it is out of this overlapping
sense of unique and historically repeated moment of Floyd that the protestors outrage flows.
Another recurring element of the protestor's rhetoric involved “being heard.” This idea is
again not new to the protests, as William Lloyd Garrison expressed as much in 1831, saying “I
am in earnest — I will not equivocate — I will not excuse — I will not retreat a single inch —
AND I WILL BE HEARD” (Garrison, 1831). To be heard is to be recognized as speaking and
worthy of being listened to. But this respect-of-speaking-turn has been ignored by state and
governmental bodies in relation to the problems of Black communities. As already pointed out in
protestor (0:49), the violence of the protests served a rhetorical function as speaking turn. The
argument being that the issues plaguing Black communities in Minneapolis and across the
United States have been ignored or exasperated to the point that only something as shocking as a
violent protest will give voice to those communities at all.
There is something about witnessing also at work here. For just as the shock of violence
and force used against Floyd opened the horizon of witnessing for viewers, so too could the
shock of violence used by protestors. Harry A. Bailey wrote “to get others to listen is not
unconnected with the possession of power to force one's argument” (Bailey, 1972), so to force
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government officials, celebrities, major new networks, to all pay attention is to exert power; in
this case a power connected to the recognition of one participation in the category of human.
Furthermore, as Craig A. Hosterman (1978) argues, violence displays the intensity of those who
use it. To see the level of destruction that the protestors are willing to enact is to see how deeply
felt their commitment to their message is. As Hosterman says, “rhetorical violence could not
only focus visibility and attention on a problem, it could also demonstrate the seriousness of a
problem and the intensity of the protesters” (1978, p. 14). To read the seriousness of the
protestors inscribed in their violence is to witness how serious the problem of police brutality
and state neglect is for Black lives.
Examples of this “being heard” ideograph include protestor (1:08) who says,
He called us thugs and we’re out here living through hundreds of years of discrimination
and a bunch of stigma that we face every single day. We tried, we tried peaceful
protesting, we tried every different direction, and this was our last resort.” (Minneapolis
Protest, 2020)
Protestors (2:30) say,
Speaker 1:
Fuck those other media outlets because they’re gonna try to portray us in a bad light by
only showing what's going on over here at the end of the day-- (interrupted)
Speaker 2:
This is the only way we are heard-- (interrupted)
Speaker 3:
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Actions speak louder than words bro, fuck all that talking. Then signals with his hands as
if he were zipping up his mouth and throwing away the key
(Minneapolis Protest, 2020)
The constant interruptions or stepping over of speaking turns signals the degree to which these
speakers are affectively charged in the moment. A felt sense of urgency is inciting them to speak
even when the normal conventions of talking would demand that they wait their turn. The very
structure of their speaking here betrays the level to which they are affectively moved by the
moment in which they are in. Next, notice how civility and civic protocol are here recognized as
a weapon used against the protestors and the communities that they are a part of to ignore their
plight. Protestor (1:08) mentions how Donald Trump (president at the time and the “he” that is
referred to there) called the protestors “thugs” despite “hundreds of years and a bunch of stigma”
that have led to the conditions under which an incident like Floyd can happen. Furthermore,
protestor (1:08) mentions how “peaceful protesting” had already been tried and the violence on
display is a “last resort”. Here the system, embodied by Trump, is not designed to protect the
kinds of communities and people the protestor is advocating for, but this is being swept under the
rug by using loaded terms like “thug”. But how is this fair when Black death is a recurring
problem over hundreds of years, peaceful protests have been tried and failed, and now violence
is being used as a last resort? The argument here being that to associate the “end product” of
violence with the totality of Black resistance is only to perpetuate the kinds of system blindness
that led to this issue in the first place.
A similar sentiment is expressed by protestors (2:30) although with a different kind of
emphasis. Here the concern expressed is regarding not only the lack of civic speaking turn, but
about the distortion of that speaking. The problem is not only not being allowed to speak, but

91

“those other media outlets” that will present what the protestors are doing “in a bad light by only
showing what’s going on over here at the end of the day.” These media outlets, like the statement
made by Trump, ignore the history of Black death and peaceful protest and instead choose to
focus only on the destructive and violent means by which these communities have forced a
speaking turn. Like protestor (1:08), protestors (2:30) recognize that the entirety of the protest
movement is not summed up in images of violence, but violence here is “the only way we are
heard”. This sentiment is further expressed with the statement “fuck all that talking” and the lip
zipping gesture. Trying to talk has only ever supported the actions of the state in ignoring the
struggles of Black communities. The time for talking has ended, now is the time to be heard.
This hearing reaches beyond words to a more primordial expression of pain. The seriousness of a
person’s commitment is affirmed when they reach the threshold of violence. To cross that
threshold is to be committed enough to take responsibility for the consequences of being violent,
and in doing so we can grasp the degree to which these communities have been hurting.
Both of these statements connect the Minneapolis protests to a history of Black resistance
in the face of state or sanctioned willful disinterest and in that sense to Black memory. Of
consequence here is the way in which they frame violence, specifically against stereotypical
constructions of Blackness. The idea that Black people are inherently violent is one of the oldest
interpellations of Blackness in the western consciousness (Fanon, 1967; Hooks, 1992). As such it
would have been very easy for media corporations to use the images of violence from the
protests to perpetuate a narrative in support of the idea of Blackness as being violent7. But
listening to the statements made by the protestors, the violence was not an expression of innate
tendencies, it was a controlled, passionate reaction to repeated systemic failure.
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Another protestor (3:20) says, “If I had my knee on a white man neck with two of my
motherfucking niggas holding his legs, come on now...” (Minneapolis Protest, 2020). This
protestor directly invokes race and larger cultural understandings of racial hierarchy in his
message regarding the protest. Note that it isn’t just a person with another person on their neck,
but a “white man” along with the speaker and two of his “motherfucking niggas.” The use of
white signifies the cultural and legal capital that whiteness affords to those who have it, while the
use of the curse word “motherfucking” and the racial slur “niggas” situates the view of how
mainstream media and whiteness would see the situation. To someone who sees Black people as
just “motherfucking niggas”, this situation would be unconscionable. Yet in Floyd’s case we are
supposed to just be quiet and let the system do its job? Absolutely not, and just like white
America would come with outrage to the defense of a white man, so too has the Black
community of Minneapolis responded to this injustice. And again we see this the linking of the
“knee” as both symbol for historic systemic oppression and expression of barbaric violence done
against weaker communities.
It is important to note that the protests and the protestors were not a monolith. Some
protestors expressed a critique of the violence, separating the protest into two factions: those who
were being destructive and those who were really fighting for the cause. Protestor (3:28) said this
It doesn't really make sense to me to be honest. It’s just that I don’t support the looting
and the fires, I’m just supporting the cause. I can’t do anything to help it. Like I wish I
could put this shit out right now cuz like, Target I don’t care about cuz it’s a big
corporation but like all these small businesses, that sucks. (Minneapolis Protest, 2020)
Meanwhile, another protestor, (4:23), expressed a similar concern, though he attempted to place
his position in relation to previous civil rights demonstrations
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I just think what people are doing here is ruining the whole point of this. The media is
gonna pay attention more to the crime being committed with the looting rather than the
anger and the injustice. I’m trying to stop people from doing that. I think there’s a right
way to protest and that’s peacefully. We saw that many times with Martin Luther King
demonstrations and those marches, they were known for their peace, and I think our
generation has something to learn. (Minneapolis Protest, 2020)
Both protestors here see the situation as a bifurcated event; there is the protest that is legitimate
that proceeds non-violently and utilizes verbal means of communication to try and make its voice
known. And then there is the illegitimate protest that uses violence and destruction to be heard,
and it is through these tactics that the protest invalidates and undermines itself. Protestor (3:28)
does allow for certain kinds of violence, if the victim is in a position to be largely unharmed
(“Target I don’t care about”) while protestor (4:23) does not allow for violence at all,
condemning the violence as a distraction from “the anger and the injustice” of what happened to
Floyd. He even goes on to say that this “generation” of protestors has “something to learn” from
the civil rights protests of the 1950s and 60s in that the acceptability of the present protests is in
question when compared to the protests of the past. The past protests are the “right way” to do it,
non-violently, peacefully. This is the right way to express oneself in the political arena.
The logic of these two protestors is centered around an understanding of political
activism that is grounded in a respect for the rules of speaking expressed in the practice of turntaking. When one group “hears” an injustice, they take their turn in “speaking” against it, at
which point 3rd parties can listen to the grievances laid out by the protestors and then judge
accordingly how well those grievances accord with reality. This is a fairly common view in the
West regarding civic and political engagement (Rawls, 1999) where there is a necessary
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assumption of equal standing between the parties involved, and it is from this equal position that
one can then dialogue or discourse their way to a solution.
There is a position from which this view can be critiqued that focuses on the ideological
shenanigans at play. Specifically, how glorifying “non-violence” only serves those in power as
their actions (which involve benefiting from an inherently unjust and exploitative system) and
the actions of their agents (the police) are not read as violence, but instead natural actions that are
beyond the control of individuals occupying those spaces. Said another way, the violence of cops
is covered over because they are “just doing their job” or “keeping the peace” and the
exploitation of the poor by the rich is not exploitation at all, and the poor should “work harder” if
they want to get ahead. From this view, the “violence” of the protestors is not out-of-the-blue but
rather a meeting of like-against-like regarding the violence of the United States political and
economic system. However, this is not the view I want to focus on here nor is it necessarily the
position taken by other protestors in response critiques levied against them like those stated by
protestors (3:38) and (4:23).
Instead, many protestors responded to the criticism of their violence in a way that was
historically informed by Black memory15 and that drew on the affective experience of witnessing
the Floyd video. In the responses I have access to, two kinds of answers were provided. The first
one is best expressed by Loretta Van Pelt, an activist organizer:
In this city people are frustrated and that's why Minneapolis is burning, basically because
people have had enough, and people are angry, and I see nothing wrong with that. I think
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what they're doing is righteous, I think it was long overdue...The system’s rotten to the
core. (Behind the Scenes at the Minneapolis Protests, 2020)
Van Pelt presents a view of the protestors as a separate entity from herself. She mentions
“people”, presenting herself as someone outside of the protests and her view of them as
evaluative from a third part perspective. It is interesting to note her use of the term “righteous” to
describe the violence she sees as “righteous” as a descriptor connects human violence with a
kind of cosmic justice that that violence carries out. When described in these terms, violence
takes on a different kind of meaning, one which acknowledges that prior history of unjust
violence that was missing from the protesting critics. The view of righteous violence recognizes
the violence of the protests but sees it as an effect of a history of abuses and injustice carried out
by those in power. And it differs from the justifications of violence offered by the lynch mobs of
the 19th and 20th century in how justice is understood. For the lynch mobs, justice is whatever
maintain the racial order. For the Minneapolis protestors, justice was the recognition of human
rights and dignity.
As a historical parallel, the events of the white night riots might be instructive on this
front. On November 27, 1978, Dan White shot and killed city supervisor and political activist
Harvey Milk and Mayor George Moscone. Milk had been a major player in the politically active
gay community of San Francisco and their fight against anti-gay legislation and police abuses,
while Moscone had been instrumental in signing into law pro-LGBT legislation. White, also a
city supervisor, had become frustrated with Milk and Moscone and had left the political scene,
but became worried when he realized that his position would be filled by someone of Moscone's
choosing. So, he snuck into the city hall and shot both men. Six months later, White was found
guilty not of murder but of voluntary manslaughter and given 7 years 8 months, with good
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behavior giving him a possible release time of 5 years. The gay community of the Castro district
and San Francisco was furious, not only because of the blatant disregard for gay life, but also
because of the nature of White’s defense and the lack of action by the prosecutor. A protest
spontaneously formed that involved walking from the Castro district to city hall. But as the walk
progressed, protestors became more and more agitated, culminating in the destruction of
property, the burning of police cars and clashes with police.
The next day, gay political leaders did not apologize. Instead, Harry Britt, who had
replaced Milk as city supervisor for the Castro district, said
Harvey Milk's people do not have anything to apologize for. Now the society is going to
have to deal with us not as nice little fairies who have hairdressing salons, but as people
capable of violence. We're not going to put up with Dan Whites anymore. (Shilts, 1988)
Britt’s statement connects the capacity for violence not as a rejection of the political ideal, but
rather as an affirmation of humanity and therefore not simply justified, but necessary. The
images of burning police cars during the protest became an iconic symbol16 while in the
aftermath of the protest political and legal changes were implemented (Mounts, 1999). The 1979
municipal elections, which happened only a few months after the protest, were anticipated to be
a negative evaluation of the protest (Shilts, 1988), yet the gay community ended up wielding a
large amount of influence in the election and saw gains in their representation at the political
level. Together this information paints a picture of understanding regarding the violence of the
white night riots. That is, people saw the trial and its outcome and when confronted with the
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For example, The Dead Kennedys used an image of one of the burning police cars as the album cover
of their debut album Fresh Fruit for Rotting Vegetables in 1980.

97

outburst of destruction by the gay community of the Castro district they got it. And as justified
violence, we could say that the riots were a form of righteous violence, justified in their
commitment and expression of a greater idea of justice than what had been given to them. In the
same way, Van Pelt constructs a view of the protests as righteous violence, as outpouring of pent
up, holy anger at the injustice and unfairness of the systems of power that shape and police the
everyday of so many people in oppressed communities.
While the first response provided an evaluative assessment of the protests as third person
judgement, the second response speaks from the perspective of an in-group member. Protestor
(4:51) encapsulates this response as follows,
Fuck that, we tired homie. We tired of that punk ass shit. What if we gave them back they
white sheets? The racist pigs. What if we gave them back they white sheets? What if they
left in white sheets? What if I had my knee on they neck? For eleven minutes. I think shit
would change. It should have started with Mookie Moe. It should have started with Jamar
Clark. It should have started with Philando Castile. But we were peaceful. So now we’re
to the point to where we are so fed up that, you know, it may not ever stop. Until we get
the right convictions of all four. (Minneapolis Protest, 2020)
This protestor weaves a complex argument in relation to the protests. He cites the ways in which
the system has failed before with “Mookie Moe,” “Jamar Clark,” and “Philando Castile,” but it
was allowed to remain in place because the kinds of protests that happened were “peaceful.” But
being failed over and over again has left the Black community of Minneapolis “tired,” citing the
physical sensation that such structural failings can enact on oppressed peoples. He also argues
he’s tired of people condemning violent protest, as those kinds of condemnations are “punk ass
shit,” meant to keep those oppressed in their oppression. He then asks the rhetorical question of
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reciprocal violence, saying “what if we gave them back they white sheets?” asking directly what
if we saw the police as forces of racial oppression rather than as protectors of law and order?
Furthermore, he invokes the racist history of policing (Alexander, 2020) in asking about the
“white sheets” representative of the Ku Klux Klan, but does an interesting turn of phrase in
saying “what if they left in white sheets?” here implying the sheets used to cover dead bodies.
The protestor is explicitly asking what if we returned the racially oppressive violence of the
police against them, would they still treat us the way they do? But even after all of this, he still
contains his call to violence in saying that it won’t stop until “we get the right four convictions”
suggesting that even after the injustice of history and the injustice of Floyd, the protestors are
still interested in getting justice itself.
This response to criticism is far more direct in addressing ignorance regarding the plight
of the Black communities within Minneapolis. Opening with “fuck” to convey the general lack
of concern regarding the opinions expressed by the protesting critics, directly calling the police
pigs, asking how they would respond to being killed, and referencing the racist history of
policing culminates in a more aggressive but honest expression of the accumulated feelings of
these communities.
Also of note, protestor (4:51) is wearing a hoodie with the infamous image of Chauvin
kneeling on Floyd’s neck emblazoned across it. However, in expressing protest through the
visual, the faces of Floyd and Chauvin have been reversed, putting Floyd’s knee on Chauvin’s
neck. While this can be seen as representative reciprocal violence, this view would ignore two
important elements that drastically affect how we are to understand the image. The first element
would be the way in which this image signifies on Floyd’s death. Signifyin(g) is a kind of
playfulness with language within African American communication which disguises meaning in
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order to communicate in indirect and roundabout ways. It uses misdirection, metaphor, humor, or
anything else it can linguistically get its hands on to help say something without actually saying
that something. Henry Louis Gates Jr. writes that signifyin(g) is
a trope, in which are subsumed several other rhetorical tropes, including metaphor,
metonymy, synecdoche, and irony (the master tropes), and also hyperbole, litotes, and
metalepsis. To this list we could easily add aporia, chiasmus, and catachresis, all of which
are used in the ritual of Signifyin(g). (Gates, 2014, p. 57)
While signifyin(g) is complex enough to warrant a study of its own, I bring it up here only to
argue that signifyin(g) is a modality of Black memory. Signifyin(g) has contributed to the
survival and continued existence of Black people in that it obfuscates their communication in a
world where the wrong communication at the wrong time can get you killed. Protestor (4:51)’s
hoodie image plays with our understanding of Floyd’s death and the message that it sent. Rather
than being surface level revenge fantasy, it instead expresses a wish to see Black people succeed
over police oppression in a way that is shocking, unexpected, and in a morbid sense, a bit
comical.
The use of irreverent images to challenge dominant discourses is not unique to Black
protests of course. AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) utilized challenging imagery to
great effect in bringing attention and advocacy to the AIDS epidemic since 1987. Their tactics
include “die-ins” where bodies of protestors were outlined in chalk to bring attention to the vast
numbers of people dying from AIDS that the government was comfortable letting happen,
protests, and community involvement. In one case, a church service was interrupted by activists
“laying down in the aisles,” blowing whistles, and throwing “hundreds of condoms in the air like
human fountains” (Christiansen & Hanson, 1996, p. 157). Images of the Virgin Mary, giant
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condoms labelled “Cardinal O’Condom,” all of this and more were at the disposal of ACT UP to
play with in making their message heard and their presence known. Rather than interpret this as
merely being confrontational or inflammatory, Christiansen & Hanson argue ACT UP utilized
the Burkean comic frame to change perspectives and take back their place as members of a
community. And while the actual analysis might be different, the idea of remixing images to
contest their meaning and the meaning of a given community united ACT UP and the
Minneapolis protestors in this respect.
The image of the hoodie with the reversed faces is doing more work than just showing
Floyd on Chauvin’s neck. Floyd and Chauvin here represent much larger social structures that
have been in conflict for a long time, specifically the police and Black communities. And
protestors all over the world picked up on this sign. Protestors in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil held
crosses with the names of victims of police violence including Floyd, but also local victims that
had not made international headlines. Protestors in Rome and Madrid utilized the phrase “I can’t
breathe” as shorthand for the abusive use of power and violence against oppressed communities,
while Aboriginal protestors in Australia performed a traditional smoking ceremony during their
protests for Floyd (Protests across the globe after George Floyd’s death, 2020).
But what is it that warranted the connection seen between these international protestors
and George Floyd, specifically? I argue it is the unstable demarcation of witnessing experienced
by viewers of the recording of Floyd’s death. In an interview with a French public radio station,
Curtis Young, a Paris based professor of literature and contemporary politics, described how
protestors in France had identified 24-year-old Adama Traoré as the “French George Floyd”
because of his death in police custody and the way the police force attempted to cover it up.
Young went on to say what he felt connected Floyd with Traoré:
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For me, the George Floyd moment was not an equivocal moment. It was clear. This was a
raw human moment of a man having the life squeezed out of him, gratuitously, by a cop
with his sunglasses on the top of his head and one hand in his pocket. (Coffey, 2021)
Notice how Young identifies affective elements of the film in identifying Floyd as unique but
also linkable? It was the video’s “raw”-ness, seeing “the life squeezed out of him”, while the cop
has “sunglasses on the top of his head and one hand in his pocket,” communicating the degree to
which this event was not affecting him. These affective elements were a necessary component in
becoming a witness to Floyd, but there is another element not mentioned here that is also vital.
And that has to do with the demarcation of witnessing.
As I have argued, when a person watches the video and becomes moved by it, it is by
affective means, and the opening up of the Event in this way offers new perspectives on how to
make sense of the world. This would mean that one can become transformed into a witness,
affectively. As I have also argued, this leaves viewers of the video in an unstable position of
witness as they are not eye-witnesses of the event, and yet the eye-witnesses on the video express
a range of emotions felt by the viewer themselves, aligning the eye-witnesses and the viewerwitness. This alignment creates a sense of identification between the viewer-witness and the eyewitness such that, affectively, there is not much difference between them. But this means that,
like the eye-witnesses of the video, our cries are ignored by Chauvin and his fellow officers. We
experience the helplessness of Floyd’s murder, we are left in shock and horror at what we have
just seen. In being witnesses, in identifying with the eye-witnesses, we become entangled in the
moment, we become invested in its meaning, and we become ignored by agents of the state. It is
that sense of helplessness, that sense of being ignored, that is all too familiar for oppressed
communities and so to see it plainly on display in the case of Floyd allowed protestors the world
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over to have an example, a thing they can directly point to and say, “this is what I’ve been
talking about!” The recurring themes of recognition and “being heard” speak to the extent to
which protestors identified with the ignored eye-witnesses of the video and the way in which
they (and by extension, we) were not heard.
For these (though admittedly not all) protestors, the violence being done during the
uprising is not senseless or without intention for it expressed a desire felt by all of those who are
oppressed, the desire for justice. As witnesses, even with our position unstable, we have a sense
of obligation in relation to this desire when we take on responsibility for what we have seen. The
feeling of helplessness we imagine Floyd must have felt, the shared feeling of hopelessness we
experience with the crowd in the video, coupled with the knowledge of an attempted cover up all
contribute to our felt understanding of Floyd’s death being entirely unnecessary and preventable.
A perspective informed by Black memory would inform us, however, that while Floyd’s death
was preventable it was not unanticipated. In fact, given the history of policing in the United
States one might be fair in saying it was to be expected and if nothing changes, we can expect for
it to happen again.
Hosterman, when arguing for the rhetorical weight of violent university protests in the
60s said that the students saw their violence as a frontloading for a larger rhetorical point. By
writing “position papers, lists of demands, series of grievances, or request to confront the
university president” (Hosterman, 1978, p. 15) the student protestors indicated that the violence
was meant to serve the larger point of changing an unjust system. It was because of the specific
policy change demands that the violence could be understood as rhetorical. We have an identical
case with the Minneapolis protestors. Their use of violence is not without a point, they want all
four police officers involved in the Floyd murder to have “the right four convictions.” Another
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protestor (1:26) says that the position is “complete police reform” (Behind the Scenes at the
Minneapolis Protests, 2020), and while these two positions do differ in details, the larger idea
that the violence is guided by a set of social and legal changes that can see action in the realworld ties them together. By invoking the image of Floyd, by allowing it to serve as a focusing
event, the protestors create the turn to speak that has been denied them for so long. In being able
to point to a moment representative of the everyday, protestors are able to expand the sense of
obligation beyond Floyd and towards those local expressions of oppression that exist within all
unjust hierarchies. And because of the shared sense of witnessing affectively experienced from
the video, viewers who otherwise might not have ever seen the precarity of the everyday for
oppressed people became witnesses to it, if for only a short while.
As a last example of the protests, I would like to present statements made by Marvin
Applewhite. Marvin is a protestor, but also a community organizer in Minneapolis. His
contributions will be unique in that he represents a side of the protest that was little covered by
mainstream and even independent journalists. Marvin helps his community by organizing
neighborhood clean-up details that pick-up trash and debris. When the protests began, Marvin
participated, but he did not stop his neighborhood clean-up details, nor did many of his
volunteers. As he says, “Up to now we clean up everyday, bags and bags and bags of plastic
rubber bullets you name it” (Behind the Scenes at the Minneapolis Protests, 2020). In contrast to
representations of the protestors as being destructive, Marvin and his volunteers present the
protests as being just as much about community building as it is about challenging power. When
asked about the connection he sees between the clean-up and the protest, he says “so all of this is
part of the protest, we help cleaning it up, do you know what I’m saying?” Marvin sees the act of
cleaning and caring for streets and living areas of the community as a necessary part of
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protesting police abuse. In harmony with what other protestors have said, Marvin sees the
protests sitting on a delicate balance of using violence to demand attention, but at the same time
this violence is nested inside of a larger concern regarding community life and the everyday. As
such, the violence is not blind, but is directed and intentional, and afterwards efforts are made to
clean up what destruction has been done. This cleaning contributes to a view of the protests as
being about more than just the violence contained within them, but about the material conditions
of the people protesting.
And when asked his thoughts on the current state of the city, Marvin said this:
Like doomsday. That's what it's gonna look like. Minneapolis ain’t gonna come back for
another four, five years. This is the effect of the cause, you know the cause was a young
man got killed by a police officer, you know with his, with his knee in his neck so this is
the effect. Believe me everybody is gonna put the brooms down, there’s gonna be
protesting. This is part of it.
(Interviewer):
And after the protest you pick the brooms back up?
Marvin:
You pick it back up. That's what we do.
(Behind the Scenes at the Minneapolis Protests, 2020)
Marvin notes the destruction across the city, likening it to “doomsday” but says that this is all the
result of a “cause,” which is Chauvin killing Floyd. And again, note how Marvin indicates
Floyd’s murder; by specifically referencing the “knee in his neck.” This suggests that, for Marvin
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and others, while Chauvin’s killing of Floyd was unacceptable, it was in part the way it was done
that truly appalled, as even this activist takes note of the manner of killing. This aligns with my
earlier analysis of the affective element of Chauvin’s use of his knee, and the number of times
that protestors have mentioned the “knee on his neck” across all of my archive here indicates the
intensity to which viewers and witnesses responded to that image. And when something this
egregious happens, “everybody is gonna put the brooms down” and take action as a connective
whole. As witnesses we have a duty to express what feelings and affect have accumulated and to
challenge the system that allows for such an event as Floyd to take place. But also note how
Marvin does not see the protest as an end goal in itself, nor does he distance himself from the
responsibility of dealing with the aftermath of the protest. In fact, Marvin argues that it is a part
of the protesting culture that you take responsibility. That is, “you pick it back up. That’s what
we do.”
This view of the protests and the protestors constructs them not as “thugs” or as
inherently destructive individuals, but as a responsible connective/collective responding to a
threat against their very person. This threat, unlike the “tragedy” of unique event, is ever-present
in the everyday and can rupture the fabric of a community at any time. And operating from
within the repertoire of Black memory, not only can we anticipate this rupturing, we can know
that it will go unaddressed by those who have the power to change it. That is, unless we do
something. Raging against this machine is difficult as there are so many different perspectives in
relation to tactics and praxis, yet the protestors of Minneapolis constructed their resistance in
such a way that their fight could be picked up and linked to other struggles against oppression
around the world. This was done in part by presenting the responsible actions of the protestors
along with presenting the violent/affectively charged side of demanding attention. In making
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their demands known, in taking responsibility for the destruction they had caused, and in linking
the event of Floyd’s murder with a longer history of Black death, the protestors constructed a
narrative around their use of violence that saw it as not as essential expression, but as “glorious
poetic rage” (Wortham, 2020).
But this dual presentation was suffused with an assumed obligation bestowed on
viewers of the Floyd video as transformed witnesses to his event. The experience of witnessing
Floyd aligns the viewer with the crowd, creating a definitionally messy sense of witnessing, but
one that is quite clearly understood through feeling. This obligation-through-transformation and
alignment of affective witnessing are the links that connect the sense of injustice felt in watching
the video with the exigence of protest. Once one can see/feel these links, the positions of the
protestors takes on a new kind of rhetorical force. It must be acknowledged that this linking, this
affectively knit connective, is not clearly defined in scope or intention. Some protestors express
only a wish to see the system destroyed. Others say that violence is warranted only until justice is
served, while still others condemn the violence in its entirety. Clearly, though there were shared
feelings of action and injustice, the expression of these feelings was not universal even amongst
the community of protestors themselves. Nevertheless, the choice to take action and the demand
for voice was shared by all protestors around the world. Whether that action is informed by the
repertoire of Black memory, emotionally charged calls for justice grounded in transcendental
moral principles or calls to help care for the community through supportive action, linking the
witnessing of Floyd to the protests allowed for new epistemic horizons to flourish. And it is from
these horizons that so many others were able to link their own experiences and sense of justice
onto the protest itself.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
It is impossible to determine an absolute frame of reference by which we could say the
protest ended. Even if we ignore the international linkages and co-protests, we still must contend
with the confusion regarding what constitutes the continuance of a protest. If the protestors go
home, then come back the next day with the same message, is it the same protest or a different
one? If it’s the same, then what stops us from grouping all protests with similar messages into
one large meta-protest? We identify that a protest that happened fifty years ago is different from
a protest that happens now, even if they have the same message, but what exactly is it that we
use to make that determination? These are philosophical questions regarding language,
epistemology, and ontology that I am not intending to deal with here. Instead, I only want to
draw your attention to the fact that any lines drawn regarding when the Minneapolis protests
stopped are going to be fraught with subjectivity and arbitrariness. And seeing as how I am about
to start drawing those lines, it seemed only fair to bring forward the difficulty doing so presents
to both myself and you as a reader.
In September of 2020, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)
released an early report on United States protests and the violence associated with them ranging
from May to August of 2020. Following this initial report, they released a longer and more
sustained report in May of 2021 (The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, 2021) in
which they re-affirmed the findings in the shorter initial report. I mention this for two reasons;
first to give myself a time frame from which to refer to the protests. While this study has been
focused on the initial protest immediately following Floyd’s murder, these protests spread in
such a way that determining when they ended is difficult. Yet they most certainly did end. This
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report gives me a time frame that I can refer to in order to help make sense of the events and
discourses surrounding the protest. And second, this report allows me to make claims regarding
the limits of the rhetorical force of violence and affect. I have argued that the transformative
moment of the Event, using affect as a modality, can turn a viewer into a witness with a sense of
obligation. This obligation was then threaded into the narratives and justifications of the
protestors with great success. Yet the protests did eventually fade, and the lingering of that
transformation, though perhaps still felt, eventually gave way to different concerns. How did this
happen, and what contributed to this fading? Data from the report suggests it was a variety of
causes, which have implications for the claims I have made here.
According to the ACLED report, only 6% of the Floyd protests around the country saw
any form of violence (The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, 2021), and it was the
heavy-handed response by the state, violent counter-protestors, and car-rammings that increased
tensions and thus violence through the duration of the 3-months in question. That being said, by
mid- to late-August of 2020, most of the support for BLM17 had dropped back down to pre-Floyd
levels (Civiqs, 2022). And despite the findings by the ACLED report, a December 2020 study by
NPR/Ipsos (More than 1 in 3 Americans believe a ‘deep state’ is working to undermine Trump,
2020; NPR Cookie Consent and Choices, 2020) found that 47% of Americans polled thought that
the majority of the summer protests had been violent . The protests were certainly subjected to a
specific framing within the media that focused on the violence itself, treating the protests as a
kind of afterthought. This contributed to a larger view of the protests as being especially violent

As I’ve stated before, there is technically a difference between BLM and Minneapolis protestors and therefore a decrease in
support for one is not necessarily a decrease in support of the other. However, the fact that so many Minneapolis protestors relied
on BLM slogans and networks over the course of their protest, as well as the fact that much of the legislation passed to prevent
another Minneapolis protest directly targeted tactics used by BLM, it is not a stretch to see the two as linked enough for us
discuss them at the same time.
17

109

even though no data exists to support this position. In my own experience I know that family
members and relatives are still upset that not enough was done to “punish the looters,” and when
I point out the ACLED data, they counter with all the images of burning and looting that they
saw on TV. Their argument, that if an event is on TV it is essentially the most important aspect
of the given event, of course ignores all the other ways one can gain information about an event
but the larger idea here is that the violence did over-take (or was forced to over-take) the
demands for political and social reform being spread by the protestors and as such there are in
fact limits to how persuasive affect and violence can be18.
In this project, I have attempted to show how participants of the Minneapolis protest used
affective threading as justification for violent actions. I have argued that through the Event of
seeing Floyd’s murder as mediated through video, viewers were affectively transformed into
witnesses, taking on a sense of obligation for what they had witnessed. In this respect, I have
tried to contribute to a larger discussion surrounding affective exchange within and through
disparate groups of people and how they can be brought together. Fundamentally, this work
supports many of the claims regarding affect and social movement rhetoric found in the
literature. These include claims about the non-discursivity of the Event as epistemological
challenge, affect as both separate from and intimately connected with emotion, the relationship
between affectivity and witnessing, and social movement rhetoric as struggle over/for meaning.
My driving question has been “what made Floyd’s death different?” and answering this
has required a multi-pronged approach. Chapter one established some context and history

I do not have the space for it here, but I feel it necessary to also point out that “messaging” can be difficult when an audience
has a vested interest in misunderstanding what you are saying. For those family and relatives, it is not that they do not have a way
to learn this information, it is that being opposed to BLM and the protests is a larger political stance for them (look at the Civiqs
data regarding party affiliation for a clear view of this), so to acknowledge that the protests were in fact peaceful would be to
capitulate to something much bigger than the protest themselves.
18
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regarding Minneapolis and Floyd as a person as well as presented the facts of the matter for
those who may have been unaware. But in answer the question, first we needed to look
deliberately and carefully at the affective elements of the video recording of Floyd’s murder.
Chapter two was devoted to this task and sought to frame his murder within a larger context of
affect, witnessing, and the social constraints on the visual which I referred to as “hooded
lynching.” In addition, Floyd’s death was also catalyzing in the way that the meaning over is
death and body were contested, and it was through the efforts of many activists, protestors,
politicians, and others that this contestation became socially relevant. Chapter three was devoted
to understanding the ways in which protestors utilized the affectivity of Floyd’s murder in
conjunction with the obligation of witnessing to justify their actions and demand change, and I
have argued that here is where we can find our answer.
However, I do think there are elements here that require further study as they are either
under-represented in the literature, or they point towards work that has yet to be done. One of
these elements would be the ways in which Black memory keeps the concerns of social
movement rhetoric grounded in the material conditions of people. Cloud (1999) relied on
“Signifyin’” as a rhetorical tool indicative of the material concerns of Black people during the
uprising of ‘34, and my use of Black memory has been an attempt keep this concern with
materiality centered. This is not to make claims regarding the difference between “Signifyin’”
and Black memory, but rather an attempt to recognize the tools utilized by Black activists and
trace the ways in which these tools contributed to the spread of their message.
But in keeping with this line of thinking, I would like to address some of the limitations
and extensions relevant to this project. One way in which this project could be extended is to
look more closely at how affect cools or sediments around an object or Event, rendering it

111

“rational”. As mentioned in Bens’ (2018) chapter, experiences can invest objects with affective
weight given any number of variables. Using this as a starting point, one could begin to
investigate how it is that support for BLM cooled at the rate that it did and see to what extent
affect was invested or divested within narratives surrounding this phenomenon. Alternatively,
Analyzing Affective Societies: Methods and Methodologies (Knoblauch et al., 2019) offers a host
of methods and practices regarding affective investigation. Applying different methods towards
making sense of the affective exchange of witnessing Floyd’s murder could yield thoughtful
insights into the ways in which affect moves between bodies.
Another extension of the work involves an aspect that I was initially interested in
investigating which focused on distribution and the role it plays in how we make sense of
experiences and affect. Borrowing heavily from DeLuca (an artifact still present in the work
itself), one could investigate the ways in which the public screen played a role in the
“witnessing” experienced by many viewers of Frazier’s recording of Floyd. But considering the
“cooling” of affect regarding the protests over the summer, a necessary component of fully
understanding the protest would involve looking at the counter-narratives more carefully to see
how they attempted to deal with the affective moment of Floyd. Mark Major (2020) published an
article in which he outlines a history of conservative animosity towards the press which
culminated in Donald Trump. He identifies a “conservative countersphere” as a reactionary
space in which a dominant group withdraws and regroups in order to organize ‘ideas, strategies,
and narratives” (p.21), and perhaps this would be a fruitful area of study regarding how counternarratives flourished in the United States throughout the summer of 2020.
A third extension could involve looking at the video of Floyd’s murder and the
subsequent protests through the lens of racial capitalism. For example, Siddhant Issar (2020)
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argues that BLM and The Movement for Black Lives counter neoliberal constructions of their
movements by grounding their responses in a historic understanding of neoliberalism and
struggle that draws heavily from Cedric Robinson’s (2000) concept of racial capitalism. Taking
this position a step further, one could look for the ways in which the unique intersection of
capitalism and race contributed to Floyd’s murder, the archiving of that murder, the distribution
of images related to the protest, and the kinds of concepts and ideographs focused on to counter
the message of the protestors. This would necessarily keep the material conditions of the
situation centered while allowing the researcher to follow shifts in meaning.
Of course, this is not a complete list of extensions of the work, but it does show that this
project can be a jumping-off point for further work that myself or others could begin, as I do
think that the full extent of Floyd’s murder and the response it garnered has not been fully
investigated. That being said, this project has certain limitations and flaws, two of which I would
like to address here.
The first major flaw has to do with the ways in which I have reproduced a male-centered
narrative as substitute for “Black struggle”. This project has been focused on Floyd and the ways
in which his death mobilized people to act. But this was not a pre-ordained response, it required
the work of countless others to bring about the message of outrage that was eventually carried
throughout the world. I have tried to indicate the places in which contributions where made by
non-male figures (including Alicia Garza, Darnella Frazier, and Samantha Pree-Gonzalez) but
the fact remains that it was around Floyd’s image and body that a response coalesced. National
responses also coalesced around Tamir rice, Ahmaud Abery, Freddie Gray, Eric Garner, Trayvon
Martin, and Michael Brown. I don’t mean to imply that attention should not have been paid to
these cases, however it is notable that all of these victims were Black men and boys, but men are
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not the only victims of state and racial oppression. The work of Andrea Ritchie and Kimberlé
Crenshaw among many others has been focused on overcoming this lack of attention paid to
Black women, and more needs to be done, but in recognizing this I also must recognize how my
work fails to meet this call.
Consider how, against expectations, Sandra Bland’s death received national attention.
But, as Brittney Cooper and Treva B. Lindsey (2018) point out, that same month, five other
Black women died in police custody and their stories did not receive major attention. These
women, Kindra Chapman of Alabama, Joyce Curnell of South Carolina, Ralkina Jones of Ohio,
Alexis McGovern of Missouri, and Raynetta Turner of New York, deserve justice. Yet my
project here, while trying to focus on conversations around Black liberation, has ignored their
suffering. And there are always more; Aiyana Stanley Jones, Deborah Danner, Chikesia
Clemmons, Mya Hall, Decynthia Clements. All victims of Black oppression. In 2015, Janelle
Monáe released “HELL YOU TALMBOUT”, a song in which the names of Black victims of
police abuse are named and recognized. The entire song consists of a chorus, and then the stating
of names. The song is nearly six minutes long. In 2021, a follow-up song, titled “Say Her Name
(Hell You Talmbout)” was released, again by Janelle Monáe. This song focused on the names of
Black women victims and featured the voices of Kimberlé Crenshaw, Beyoncé, Alicia Keys,
Alicia Garza, and many others. Regrettably, this song is nearly eighteen minutes long. Each
victim named. Each injustice spoken. Black women have been suffering, yet when studies of
Black suffering focus solely on men, the idea of who suffers from racial oppression becomes
skewed. In a more thorough or extended study, I would consider the intersection of sex within
affective witnessing, but here I can only acknowledge its absence.
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Additionally, queer and trans people of color have suffered from police and state
oppression as members of Black communities but have also had to contended with oppressions
involving gender expression and sexual orientation. This project also does not contribute to a
centering of these stories and as such is still a part of an understanding of Black liberation and
social movement that treats the suffering of Black men as “Black suffering” itself. A way to
improve this project would be to create space for queer and trans of color narratives to be
investigated affectively, socially, and rhetorically. Black communities are varied and this should
be reflected in what kinds of people and events become focused when responding to racial
oppression. By expanding who is given focus we expand the tactics by which we can engage and
dismantle systems of oppression. This would not only allow for hidden or erased stories to be
brought forward but would contribute to a more critical understanding of affective witnessing
and meaning.
The second major flaw is my re-production of a logic that requires viewing images of
Black death to acknowledge it happening, and at the same time turning these images into object
and spectacle. In his article “Black Lives as Snuff: The Silent Complicity in Viewing Black
Death” (2018), Rasul A. Mowatt takes up the issue of viewing images and videos of Black death.
He argues that circulated images of Black death serve as an “e-lynching”, which terrorize Black
people and rally those who would make a spectacle of Black death (2018). Continuing, he cites
Nataleah Hunter-Young, saying that she “asks us to consider the following reasons that many
have chosen not to view any videos or look at any images [of Black death]: ‘1. I do not need to
see it to know; 2. I don’t want to participate in the spectacle of their/her/his/my death; and 3.
Sharing this imagery does not ameliorate our present condition as Black people’” (Mowatt, 2018,
p. 798). The core of the argument is Mowatt’s concern regarding the conflicting demand of
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images of Black death. On the one hand, Black bodies are presented in order to signal to an
audience that death has happened, but on the other hand this presentation turns Black death into
an object for spectacle and viewing. He says of these killed Black bodies, “They become an
aesthetic. They become an ornament. They become an object. They become a tool. But they are
still the body of a dead mother, father, son, daughter” (p. 788). By viewing these bodies as
spectacle, even if the intention is radical or liberatory, the effect is to flatten those bodies towards
serving some other purpose beyond the simple recognizing of their humanity.
And I am sympathetic to this concern, I am even condemned in his use of quotations. I
did not watch the video of Floyd. In fact, I did not watch it until I started this project. It was the
same for the Castille video. It was the same for the Ahmaud Arbery video. And there is
something to criticize there in that I am refusing to look at their last moments, despite the fact
that they happened. But the thing is when those videos came out, I was tired. I still am. Because I
had watched and followed intently during the Trayvon Martin case. I had watched intently the
video of Tamir Rice. I had watched intently the video of Michael Brown. I had watched intently
the video of Eric Garner. And I am so tired. When another video pops up, when the conversation
starts again, when the same arguments are to be had with the same people saying the same thing,
I get exhausted. I already know what happened. I don’t, not literally, but I already know.
Continuing, Mowatt argues that the process of presentation regarding Black death has
begun to develop a logic of visuality, where the only bodies that matter are those that can be seen
or those that have been recorded. He says,
Our silence when there is no video, when there is no picture, when it is a woman, when it
is a transwoman, reveals a disingenuous aspect of our outrage when the death is “offscreen,” while our silence in the cases of Black sex workers supports acts of racial or
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gender cleansing, if we invoke the memory of Ashton O’Hara of Detroit, the “GrimSleeper” victims, or the missing girls of DC” (p. 799).
As we become accustomed to seeing images of brutalized Black bodies, we begin to expect the
creation and dissemination of those images when that event takes place. What happens when
there is no image? Mowatt argues that when there is no image, we see no crime. We do not see
Black death unless is it presented to us in a way that we can consume it, in this case visually.
And when that consumption is unavailable, we are not incited to respond.
At its core, this article condemns my entire project. What right do I have to re-introduce
and focus on the death of Floyd, especially as this re-introduction serves to further my own
interests in the academic field? Mowatt chooses to crop out those portions of the images he uses
that show Black bodies, but I do not have that option. In fact, it is the image of the Black body as
it transitioned from life to death that I am (in part) focusing on. By way of de-authorizing myself,
I’m not sure there is any way I can reconcile these two positions. At least, not in a Hegelian way.
Nor do I want to. Rather than synthesize the two positions into a new one that incorporates both
of them, I would rather carry the contradiction as it is. That is, I would rather do what I feel
compelled to do while also knowing the moral condemnation that that action entails. Much like
the political violence that I am focusing on, the point is not to ignore the violence, nor is it to
subsume the violence into a larger ethical position. I am not excusing or apologizing for it.
Rather, I want to acknowledge that structures can be in such a way that no moral or ethical
option exists. To erase this fact through theoretical synthesis is to miss the point. Plus, as Asheru
says, “Niggas are living contradictions.”
Finally, I would like to leave you with this anecdote; during the uprising I had had a
small get together online with some friends. It was me, my friend (we’ll call him Bill), his
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brother, and my roommate. Other than myself, everyone in the group call was white. The
brother, being a military man, was explaining the specifics of how the national guard would
respond if called upon, saying that they would go so far as to bomb the protestors if that’s what it
took. He argued that no legitimate debate could happen from violence, therefore the protestors
had no claims to having their position taken seriously. I said something to the effect of “why is it
so easy for you to imagine the specifics of how the national guard would mobilize an airstrike
against American citizens on American soil, but the thought that we could do something to
change policing in minority communities is somehow too much for you? Why is an airstrike
more feasible than equal rights?” and it was at this point that Bill said, “If I saw one of you guys
get treated like that. If I watched for 9 minutes while someone held you down with their knee on
your neck, and you died. I wouldn’t ask for equal rights. I wouldn’t burn down a police station.
I’d burn the whole goddamn country down.” His statement has stuck with me. To someone with
no ties to the Black community in Minneapolis, who has never experienced being Black in
America, who has never seen himself reflected in videos of policing killing minorities, for him to
have this kind of reaction to the video, for him to be able to recognize and understand the
feelings and actions of protestors 1000 miles away, that’s something. And it’s that something
that has driven me to complete this project. The criticisms still stand, but I simply cannot let go
of that something.
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